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Summer 1998



**The Fiftieth
Anniversary
of the
Marshall Plan**

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Editorial

Lutherstadt Wittenberg, June 1998

Dear Readers:

In my foreword to issue no. 40 I wrote that the period of transforming the *American Studies Newsletter* into the *American Studies Journal* was happily over and that henceforth you would receive two issues per year on time. That was, alas, a highly premature statement. I have explained the reasons for the much delayed delivery of issue no. 40 in a letter to our subscribers. Let me say here that the German Association for American Studies and the Wittenberg editorial team sincerely apologize for a sequence of unforeseen technical difficulties—most of which were beyond our control.

The current issue focusses on the Marshall Plan which was announced in 1947. The first appropriations bill, however, was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1948. Thus we are not too late in celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the European Recovery Program. Another topic featured in the following pages is U.S. education. This is the first part of a series that will be continued in the next three issues of the *ASJ*.

I have been asked to mention the main themes of upcoming issues to improve the chances of receiving contributions from our readership. That such contributions are welcome was stated in the last editorial, and I repeat it here. The following topics will be featured until the end of 1999:

- Religion in American Society (no. 42)
- American Arts at the Turn of the Century (no. 43)
- Social and Welfare Policy in the U.S. (no. 44)

No issue will be exclusively devoted to its central theme. There is room for other topics. The News/Notes/Views section, for example, also awaits your input.

Let me conclude with mentioning a few problems relating to subscriptions: We would like you to pay the subscription fee into the *ASJ* account (Sparkasse Wittenberg, BLZ 805 501 01, no. 26212). This, however, is not sufficient to ensure prompt delivery. Please don't forget to send your address to the editorial office in Wittenberg. An address entered on a bank transfer form is often distorted in the process of electronic transmittal. Another problem relates to institutional subscribers whose remittance comes from a city or county payments office. Please make sure that your school is mentioned in the form. It took us quite some time to find out that LRA ND-SOB stands for Landratsamt Neustadt/Donau-Schrobenhausen and to credit the appropriate school. (That we solved this riddle fills us with pride.)

All 1997 subscriptions have been carried over into 1998 because we decided to deliver issue no. 40 free of charge. A renewal form carrying an individual subscription number will be mailed to you along with with *ASJ* 42.

Yours sincerely,

Hans-Jürgen Grabbe
Director, Center for U.S. Studies

DGFA

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George Catlett Marshall (1880-1956)

by Jeanne Holden

Army General, Chief of Staff of the Army, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense—George Catlett Marshall served the United States and the world as a soldier and a statesman. According to Marshall's civilian superior during World War II, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Marshall was "one of the most selfless public officials" he had ever known. It is not by chance that his name is given to what Sir Winston Churchill described as "the most unsordid act in history"—the Marshall Plan—through which billions of U.S. dollars were channeled to a war-torn Europe for economic reconstruction.

The son of a coal merchant, Marshall was born in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, on December 31, 1880. He graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1901. Commissioned a lieutenant of the infantry, Marshall was first assigned to serve in the Philippines. There, according to historians and biographers, he developed the self-discipline, study habits, and other attributes of command that would allow him to excel.

During World War I, Marshall served as Chief of Operations of the First Army and gained recognition for his role in preparing the Meuse-



Argonne offensive in 1918. He later served as Assistant Commandant for Instruction at the Infantry School in Fort Benning, Georgia. At the school, Marshall made changes in instruction methods and influenced several generals who became prominent in World War II. Marshall became Chief of the War Department's War Plans Division in 1938. Nominated for Army Chief of Staff by President Franklin D. Roosevelt in early 1939, he served as acting chief for two months and then took full control on September 1, 1939—the day that World War II began with Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland.

As head of the army, Marshall directed the American military buildup for World War II. He presided over the raising of new divisions, the training of troops, the procurement of equipment, and the selection of top commanders. Under his leadership, the U.S. Army grew in less than four years from fewer than 200,000 men to a well-trained and well-equipped force of 8.3 million men. As Chief of Staff and principal U.S. war planner, Marshall strongly advocated an Allied drive on Nazi forces across the English Channel, which evolved into the Normandy invasion on June 6, 1944, and the campaign to liberate Western Europe.

Marshall's later career has often been discussed in terms of whether it was desirable to have a "military mind" in a high civilian post. U.S. statesman Dean Acheson pointed out that "nothing could be more mistaken than to believe that General Marshall's mind was a military mind in the sense that it was dominated by military considerations, that is, considerations relating to the use of force." Acheson wrote in his 1959 book, *Sketches From Life* that Marshall not only kept military concerns from ruling his civilian decisions, but also "when he thought about military problems, nonmilitary

factors played a controlling part." Bernard Baruch, an American businessman and statesman, called him "the first global strategist."

Marshall recommended that his protégé, Dwight D. Eisenhower, lead the Allied forces in Europe, after Roosevelt had decided that Marshall himself was indispensable in Washington. In late 1944, Marshall was named General of the Army.

Marshall retired as Chief of Staff in November 1945 at the age of 65. Only days after Marshall left the army, President Harry Truman persuaded him to go to China, as his special representative, to try to mediate the bitter civil war there. Although his efforts were unsuccessful, Truman asked him to accept the post of Secretary of State. The U.S. Senate disregarded precedent and unanimously approved the nomination without a hearing on January 8, 1947, making Marshall the first military leader to become the head of the U.S. Department of State. As secretary, Marshall directed his staff to formulate a program of economic recovery for Europe, which he outlined in a brief but historic address to Harvard University's graduating class on June 5, 1947.

Marshall worked at the United Nations and in other forums for treaties with the defeated powers that would restore them to places of respect and equality in the family of nations. He championed rearming Western Europe to bolster the region against potential Soviet aggression, and he indicated a willingness for the United States to participate in a regional arrangement for collective defense. He also initiated a series of regional alliances for the United States and Latin America, which were designed to promote hemispheric cooperation. Ill health led to his resignation from the State Department in early 1949.

After the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, President Truman asked Marshall to return to government as the head of the Department of Defense. In the year that he served, Marshall increased the size of the army, promoted a plan for universal military training, and helped to develop the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Marshall was dedicated to building a strong defense, but he also labored to find peaceful solutions to world conflicts. In December 1953, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace in recognition of his contributions to the economic rehabilitation of Europe. He was the first soldier to win that honor.

Not long before Marshall's death in Washington, D.C., on October 16, 1959, Winston Churchill paid him the following tribute: "During my long and close association with successive American administrations, there are few

men whose qualities of mind and character have impressed me so deeply as those of General Marshall. He is a great American, but he is far more than that. In war he was as wise and understanding in counsel as he was resolute in action. In peace he was the architect who planned the restoration of our battered European economy and, at the same time, labored tirelessly to establish a system of Western defense. He has always fought victoriously against defeatism, discouragement, and disillusion. Succeeding generations must not be allowed to forget his achievements and his example."

Jeanne Holden is a USIA Senior Staff Writer.

Acronyms Used in the Texts

CEEC	Committee for European Economic Cooperation
EC	European Community
ECA	Economic Cooperation Agency
ERP	European Recovery Program
EU	European Union
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Cooperation

Key Dates for the Marshall Plan

- March 12, 1947
The “Truman Doctrine,” outlined in a presidential speech to Congress, makes it U.S. policy to protect nations threatened by communism.
- June 5, 1947
In a speech at Harvard University’s commencement, Secretary of State George C. Marshall calls for an American plan to help Europe recover from World War II.
- June 19, 1947
The British and French Foreign ministers issue a joint communiqué inviting twenty-two European nations to send representatives to Paris to draw up a cooperative recovery plan.
- July 12, 1947
The Conference of European Economic Cooperation, which became the Committee of European Economic Cooperation (CEECE), meets in Paris. The Soviet Union declines to attend and pressures Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary into not going.
- September 1947
The CEECE submits its report estimating the needs and the cost of the European Recovery Program (ERP) over four years. The report provides for the establishment of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) to coordinate the program from the European side.
- February 1948
A Soviet-backed communist coup occurs in Czechoslovakia.
- April 2, 1948
Congress passes the Economic Cooperation Act, which authorizes the Marshall Plan. President Truman signs it the next day.
- April 1948
Paul Hoffmann of Studebaker Corporation is appointed Administrator of the Economic Cooperation Agency (ECA), the temporary American agency created to implement the plan. Averell Harriman is appointed special representative of the ECA in Europe.
- April 15, 1948
The first official meeting of the OEEC to determine national needs prior to the passage of an appropriations bill by the U.S. Congress takes place in Paris.
- June 30, 1949
The Federal Republic of Germany officially enters the OEEC in the second year of the program.
- December 31, 1951
The ERP ends six months early because of the escalation of the Korean War, which had begun in June 1950. Transfer of funds from the U.S. to Europe had totaled \$13.3 billion.
- July 5, 1972
In a speech at Harvard University’s commencement, West German chancellor Willy Brandt announces the creation of the German Marshall Fund to thank the U.S. for its assistance.

The Marshall Plan Speech

**Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
June 5, 1947**

Mr. President, Dr. Conant*, members of the Board of Overseers, Ladies and Gentlemen: I'm profoundly grateful and touched by the great distinction and honor and great compliment accorded me by the authorities of Harvard this morning. I'm overwhelmed, as a matter of fact, and I'm rather fearful of my inability to maintain such a high rating as you've been generous enough to accord to me. In these historic and lovely surroundings, this perfect day, and this very wonderful assembly, it is a tremendously impressive thing to an individual in my position.

But to speak more seriously, I need not tell you that the world situation is very serious. That must be apparent to all intelligent people. I think one difficulty is that the problem is one of such enormous complexity that the very mass of facts presented to the public by press and radio make it exceedingly difficult for the man in the street to reach a clear appraisal of the situation. Furthermore, the people of this country are distant from the troubled areas of the earth and it is hard for them to comprehend the plight and consequent reactions of the long-suffering peoples, and the effect of those reactions on their governments in connection with our efforts to promote peace in the world.

In considering the requirements for the rehabilitation of Europe, the physical loss of life, the visible destruction of cities, factories, mines, and railroads was correctly estimated, but it has become obvious during recent months that this visible destruction was probably less

serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of the European economy. For the past ten years conditions have been abnormal. The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war effort engulfed all aspects of national economies. Machinery has fallen into disrepair or is entirely obsolete. Under the arbitrary and destructive Nazi rule, virtually every possible enterprise was geared into the German war machine. Long-standing commercial ties, private institutions, banks, insurance companies, and shipping companies disappeared through loss of capital, absorption through nationalization, or by simple destruction. In many countries, confidence in the local currency has been severely shaken. The breakdown of the business structure of Europe during the war was complete. Recovery has been seriously retarded by the fact that two years after the close of hostilities a peace settlement with Germany and Austria has not been agreed upon. But even given a more prompt solution of these difficult problems, the rehabilitation of the economic structure of Europe quite evidently will require a much longer time and greater effort than has been foreseen.

There is a phase of this matter which is both interesting and serious. The farmer has always produced the foodstuffs to exchange with the city dweller for the other necessities of life. This division of labor is the basis of modern civilization. At the present time it is threatened with breakdown. The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer. Raw materials and fuel are in short supply. Machinery is lacking or worn out. The farmer or the peasant cannot find the goods for sale which he desires to purchase. So the sale of his farm produce for money which he cannot use seems to him an unprofitable transaction. He, there-

* James B. Conant (1893-1978), educator, scientist, and diplomat, was president of Harvard University.

fore, has withdrawn many fields from crop cultivation and is using them for grazing. He feeds more grain to stock and finds for himself and his family an ample supply of food, however short he may be on clothing and the other ordinary gadgets of civilization. Meanwhile, people in the cities are short of food and fuel and in some places approaching the starvation levels. So the governments are forced to use their foreign money and credits to procure these necessities abroad. This process exhausts funds which are urgently needed for reconstruction. Thus a very serious situation is rapidly developing which bodes no good for the world. The modern system of the division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down.

The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years of foreign food and other essential products—

principally from America—are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social, and political deterioration of a very grave character.

The remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their product for currencies, the continuing value of which is not open to question.

Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States



should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist.

Such assistance, I am convinced, must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full cooperation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government. Any government which maneuvers to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties, or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States.

It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist

of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so. The program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, European nations.

An essential part of any successful action on the part of the United States is an understanding on the part of the people of America of the character of the problem and the remedies to be applied. Political passion and prejudice should have no part. With foresight and a willingness on the part of our people to face up to the vast responsibility which history has clearly placed upon our country, the difficulties I have outlined can and will be overcome.

I am sorry that on each occasion I have said something publicly in regard to our international situation, I've been forced by the necessities of the case to enter into rather technical discussions. But to my mind, it is of vast importance that our people reach some general understanding of what the complications really are rather than react from a passion or a prejudice or an emotion of the moment. As I said more formally a moment ago, we are remote from the scene of these troubles. It is virtually impossible at this distance merely by reading, or listening, or even seeing photographs or motion pictures, to grasp at all the real significance of the situation. And yet the whole world of the future hangs on a proper judgement. It hangs, I think, to a large extent on the realization of the American people of just what the various dominant factors are. What are the reactions of the people? What are the justifications of those reactions? What are the sufferings? What is needed? What can best be done? What must be done?

Secretary of State George C. Marshall's Commencement Address at Harvard University.

Blueprint for Recovery

by Michael J. Hogan

I believe that, in years to come, we shall look back upon this undertaking as the dividing line between the old era of world affairs and the new—the dividing line between the old era of national suspicion, economic hostility, and isolationism, and the new era of mutual cooperation to increase the prosperity of people throughout the world.

General Marshall will be known as one of those who brought this new era into being. But he would be the first to agree that it is more than the creation of statesmen. It comes from the minds and hearts of all the people. Our peoples are united in their determination to work together to deal with the basic problems of human life. (Harry S. Truman, President of the United States, 1945-1953)

On June 5, 1947, U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall rose to address the graduating class of Harvard University. Former wartime chief of staff, the first career soldier to become secretary of state, Marshall was a man of enormous personal integrity whose selfless devotion to duty and hard-boiled honesty made him one of the most respected global leaders of the day.

The young graduates must have been honored by the presence of such a distinguished individual. Although famous men had stood in Marshall's place before, his commanding public stature and the significance of his pronouncement would mark this Harvard commencement above all others. The secretary's address set the stage for a massive American aid program to revitalize the war-devastated economies of Europe. It would become the largest such program in America's history and

one widely regarded as the most successful peacetime foreign policy launched by the United States in this century.

British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was among the many Europeans to praise what came to be known as the Marshall Plan. He called it "a lifeline to sinking men," a ray of hope where none had existed before, an act of "generosity . . . beyond belief."

The Situation in Europe

Although "V-E Day" brought the struggle against Nazi Germany to an end, the peace still had to be won, and this required, above all, the reconstruction of economic and political systems badly damaged by World War II.

The Europeans strove mightily to mend the damage. But even as Marshall spoke at Harvard, capital equipment remained hopelessly obsolete or in need of wholesale repair. The depletion of gold and dollar reserves made it difficult to import essential items and use existing facilities efficiently. Food shortages and inflation discouraged maximum efforts by a demoralized work force; shortages of coal, steel, and other basic resources further restrained production; and the severe winter of 1946-47, the worst in modern memory, nearly wiped out earlier economic gains. In 1947, Western Europe's agricultural production averaged only 83 percent of its prewar volume, industrial production only 88 percent, and exports a bare 59 percent. Translated into human terms, these figures added up to widespread fatigue and a pervasive sense of pessimism about the future.

Making matters worse, the economic crisis worked like a superheated crucible to in-

flame already serious political and diplomatic problems. In France and Italy, worsening economic conditions undermined governmental authority. In Britain, the winter crisis and the drain on reserves triggered a decision to withdraw British forces from Greece, a country racked by a bitter civil conflict that compounded the economic dislocations growing out of the war. The situation was the same in Germany. Economic conditions there remained the worst in Western and Central Europe, prompting the American occupation authorities to warn that widespread poverty was fostering a popular discontent upon which the communists were capitalizing.

Policymakers in Washington also worried about the situation in Germany. They had rejected earlier postwar proposals, notably the Morgenthau Plan, which would have prevented Germany from again becoming a unified industrial state, urging instead that reparations be held to a minimum and that a revitalized Germany be reintegrated into the European community. There were many reasons for the new policy. But of them, none was more important than the conviction in Washington that stability across the continent depended on recovery in Germany, which had long been the hub of the European economy.

The German problem exacerbated existing divisions between the former Allies, particularly those between the United States and the Soviet Union. According to wartime agreements, Germany had been divided into American, British, French, and Soviet occupation zones. The zones were to be treated as an economic unit and were to give way to a central administration and then to a new German government. Progress in this direction, however, had foundered on the incom-

patible interests of the victorious powers. They could not resolve their differences over the amount and form of reparations or over the level of industry and the degree of central administration to be accorded a united Germany. Nor could they agree on arrangements for international control of the Ruhr, where the great coal and steel industries constituted the basis of Germany's economic and military might. These and other differences came to a head at the foreign ministers' conference that convened in Moscow between January and April 1947. The negotiators were unable to agree on the terms of a German settlement. Secretary of State Marshall, who headed the American delegation, left the conference convinced that Soviet leaders hoped to gain politically from a deadlock that would deepen the economic crisis in Central and Western Europe, pave the way to victory for the Communist parties in France, Italy, and Germany, and thereby open the door to an expansion of Soviet influence in an area deemed vital to American security. "The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate," Marshall told a radio audience shortly after his return from Moscow.

Origins of a Recovery Plan

It is an idea which translates the problem from one of individual countries to one of a continent, and only a country that is a continent could look at another continent in that way. . . . When the Marshall proposals were announced, I grabbed them with both hands. I felt that it was the first chance we had ever been given since the end of the war to look at [the] European economy as a whole. (Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, 1945-1951)


Blueprint for Recovery

After returning from Moscow, Marshall set the wheels of American recovery planning in motion. He instructed the State Department's Policy Planning Staff and other agencies to report on Europe's need for economic assistance and on the conditions that should govern American aid.


These reports were then combined with recommendations coming from other quarters, notably from Under Secretary of State William L. Clayton, to lay the foundation for the proposal that Marshall would announce at Harvard University. In this and subsequent pronouncements, Marshall and his colleagues urged the Europeans to take the initiative and assume the responsibility for drafting a program of economic recovery. The Americans would pro-

vide "friendly aid" in the drafting process and financial support for a workable program—a regional program, not a collection of disparate national schemes—that was founded on such principles as self-help, resource sharing, and German reintegration.

This was the "lifeline" that the Europeans needed, and most of them, as British Foreign Secretary Bevin recalled, "grabbed" it "with both hands." Bevin and French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault first met to discuss Marshall's proposal with Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav M. Molotov, who said that a regional recovery program would violate national sovereignties. The meeting broke down when Molotov refused to approve a program organized on this basis, whereupon Bevin and Bidault convened



Percentage of Currency Allocations (April 3, 1948 - June 30, 1952)



a second conference that opened in Paris on July 12, 1947. The Soviets again declined to participate, and they prevented the Poles and the Czechs from attending as well.

At the conference, the occupation authorities represented the Western zones of Germany. Joining them were the delegates of 16 European nations: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey.

The conferees spent two months drafting a comprehensive recovery plan that came close to what the Americans had in mind. As modified by subsequent deliberations in Washington, this plan became the basis for the Euro-

pean Recovery Program that President Harry S. Truman presented to Congress in December 1947 and that Congress passed as the Economic Cooperation Act in the spring of the following year. The act provided over \$5 billion for the first 18 months of what eventually became a four-year program that would cost the American people approximately \$13 billion before it ended in 1952. This sum must seem trifling today, when taxpayers shoulder government expenditures in excess of millions upon millions of dollars, but it amounted to between 5 and 10 percent of the federal budget over the life of the recovery program, or about 2 percent of the gross national product over the same period. An aid program of equal proportions in 1997 would be worth many times the amount of the one that Truman initially presented 50 years earlier.

The U.S. Domestic Debate

Churchill's words won the war, Marshall's words won the peace. (Dirk Stikker, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, 1948-1952)

Coming on top of the \$9 billion already expended on a variety of postwar programs in aid of Europe, the Marshall Plan appropriation was bound to raise objections in Congress. Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio led a group of economy-minded legislators who were convinced that Marshall aid would aggravate existing shortages in the United States. It would drive up the wholesale price index, they argued, and end in new government controls over the economy. These arguments had more than a passing appeal to a population weary of wartime sacrifices, high taxes, government controls, and items in short supply.

Nor did economic issues exhaust the list of objections. Taft and his allies, who represented an older, isolationist tradition in American diplomacy, also worried lest the Marshall Plan entangle the United States in the affairs of Europe at a time when tensions there could spark another world war.

These were serious reservations, but in the ensuing debate, supporters of the Marshall Plan organized a mighty offensive that overturned the arguments mounted by their opponents. Spokespersons for the Truman administration led the offensive, testifying before congressional committees, speaking at public meetings across the country, and organizing three presidential commissions to explain how the United States could manage an expensive foreign aid program without wrecking its economy. In collaboration with their government counterparts, a variety of private groups

also threw their support behind the Marshall Plan. These included the major trade unions, the leading farm associations, and powerful elements in the business community, as well as the Committee for the Marshall Plan, a nonpartisan group composed of former government officials and representatives of business, labor, and agriculture.

In public and private forums alike, the spokespersons for these groups joined the Truman administration to defend the Marshall Plan as an act of creative statesmanship, an instrument of American as well as European interests. It would reverse the economic deterioration in Europe, they said, put participating countries on a self-supporting basis, and clear a path to the multilateral system of world trade envisioned in the Bretton Woods agreements of 1944.

Political and strategic arguments paralleled those of an economic nature. The United States, these arguments ran, must forsake the discredited policies of the past. Security against aggression could not be found in the isolationism urged by Taft but in a policy that put American aid behind beleaguered friends on the continent. Such a policy would reinvigorate fragile political coalitions that were committed, like the United States, to democratic forms of government and would reassemble the components of a balance of power strong enough to contain the Soviets. These were persuasive arguments, made even more persuasive by Britain's withdrawal from Greece, by the labor unrest in France, Germany, and Italy, and by the communist coup that toppled the democratic government of Czechoslovakia in February 1948.

After four months of deliberation, the U.S. Congress passed the Economic Cooperation Act in the spring of 1948. The vote in the

House of Representatives was 329 in favor and 74 opposed, while that in the Senate was 69 in favor and 17 opposed—margins that belied the intensity of the debate and the inveterate opposition of the measure's critics. American diplomacy would never be the same again.

Enlisting the Private Sector

To administer the Marshall Plan, Congress established the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), complete with an administrator in Washington, D.C., a special representative in Paris, and local missions in each of the participating countries. The ECA had complete control over operational matters and shared with the U.S. Department of State responsibility for shaping policy. Undergirding this organizational arrangement was the assumption, widely held in Washington, that revitalizing production, solving complicated trade and financial problems, and managing the other tasks involved in Europe's recovery required a technical and business acumen that the State Department did not possess. A special administration staffed by the "best brains" from the areas of business, labor, agriculture, and the professions—what Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan called a "business enterprise" led by men with "particularly persuasive economic credentials"—was needed.

These arguments convinced President Truman. He promptly appointed Paul G. Hoffman, president of the Studebaker automotive corporation, as the ECA's administrator in Washington, and W. Averell Harriman, a prominent figure in the business and banking communities, as the special representative in Paris. Harriman was a former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, envoy to Great Britain, and

U.S. Secretary of Commerce, while Hoffman had served on presidential and business advisory groups that backed the Marshall Plan during the congressional debates of 1948.

Hoffman and Harriman filled their offices with top men from the academic and corporate worlds. College graduates, especially graduates of Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and other highly regarded institutions, occupied virtually all high-level positions. The list included such professionals as Milton Katz, a professor at Harvard Law School who became Harriman's general counsel in Paris, and Richard M. Bissell, Jr., a Keynesian economist who became assistant deputy administrator in Washington. Men with corporate backgrounds were even more prominent, filling key positions in Washington and Paris and serving as ECA mission chiefs in most of the participating countries. The major farm groups donated members to the private advisory committees established by the ECA, worked closely with its overseas missions, and helped to staff its food and agriculture divisions. Much the same was true of the American Federation of Labor, the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and the other trade unions. In these and other ways, the ECA became the center of a vast network of cooperation between public policymakers and private leaders, whose skills contributed immeasurably to an efficient and bipartisan administration of the recovery program.

This administrative system did not stop at the water's edge. In accordance with the principles of maximum self-help, mutual aid, and shared responsibility, Marshall and other officials insisted from the start that participating countries take the initiative and play a major role in their own recovery. This required a regional authority that could speak for Europe with a single voice.

The participating countries met this requirement by establishing the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Headquartered in Paris, the OEEC worked in tandem with the ECA to devise annual recovery plans, allocate American aid, make currencies convertible, and loosen the restraints on production and trade. The two agencies had their differences, of course. But their cooperation never broke down, nor did their dogged pursuit of European recovery.

The OEEC quickly assembled a distinguished staff in Paris, arguably the most impressive assembly of economic and financial talent anywhere in the world. Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak, one of the great champions of Western European unity, chaired the OEEC Council, which comprised national representatives from each country. Robert Marjolin of France, another advocate of European unification and a prime mover behind the French Monnet Plan, headed the OEEC's international secretariat. For the most part, equally impressive figures stood in for government ministers at the head of their national delegations, one of the most notable being Sir Edmund Hall-Patch of Great Britain.

A civil servant with experience in the British Treasury and Foreign Office, Hall-Patch chaired the OEEC's Executive Committee. The OEEC never became a truly supranational authority of the sort that most Americans and many Europeans had in mind. But under the leadership of able men, it proved to be an effective instrument of economic cooperation with an increasingly European identity and a burgeoning staff of international public servants.

The network of cooperation stretched from the OEEC's headquarters in Paris across the map of Western Europe, involving at every

level a pattern of power-sharing between public officials and private leaders much like the one that took shape around the ECA. Each of the participating governments established its own recovery agency, many of which, like the central planning commission in France, involved the active participation of business, labor, and farm groups. The same groups established links with the ECA's missions in the participating countries, as well as with the OEEC. They also joined forces in the national production centers and productivity teams that were established with American support to improve industrial efficiency and maximize output. Through these and similar initiatives, American and European leaders mobilized a powerful alliance of private groups behind the vision of a shared abundance that lay at the heart of the Marshall Plan.

Partners in Reconstruction

Thanks to the Marshall Plan, the economy of the democratic part of Europe was saved. The aims defined by General Marshall in his Harvard speech were attained. The success was a striking demonstration of the advantages of cooperation between the United States and Europe, as well as among the countries of Europe themselves.
(Paul-Henri Spaak, Prime Minister of Belgium, 1947-1949)

The Marshall Plan was fundamentally a joint enterprise. The major American contribution took the form of primary products and manufactured goods in short supply on the continent or in the overseas territories of the participating countries.

Approximately \$12 billion in Marshall Plan aid had been expended by the middle of 1951,

much of which helped member states to finance essential imports of fuel (\$1.6 billion); food, feed, and fertilizers (\$3.4 billion); and machines, vehicles, and equipment (\$1.9 billion).

These imports combined with other forms of American assistance to bring a high de-

gree of economic progress and stability to Western Europe. Inflation had been contained in most of the participating countries by 1950, and both intra-European and extra-European trade had recovered to levels well above those anticipated at the start of the Marshall Plan. Shortages growing out of the



Coal shipment to the Netherlands

Korean War undercut these gains. But this was a temporary reversal in an established pattern of recovery that resumed in the early 1950s, continued unabated over the next decade, and led to the restoration of European currency convertibility and the formation of a multilateral trading system comparable to the one envisioned at Bretton Woods.

Something similar can be said of the recovery of Western European production. During the Marshall Plan period, Western Europe's aggregate gross national product jumped by more than 32 percent, from \$120 billion to \$159 billion. Agricultural production climbed 11 percent above the prewar level, and industrial output increased by 40 percent against the same benchmark.

The designers of the Marshall Plan cannot take all of the credit for this remarkable record of success. Local resources accounted for 80 to 90 percent of capital formation in the major European economies during the first two years of the recovery program. Compared to this effort at self-help, some might conclude, the American contribution was marginal measured in quantitative terms, and actually declined in the years after 1949. In truth, however, American aid and European effort were linked inextricably. The Marshall Plan, as Paul Hoffman once explained, provided the "critical margin" of support that made European self-help possible. It facilitated essential imports, eased production bottlenecks, encouraged higher rates of capital formation, and helped to suppress inflation—all of which led to gains in productivity, to improvements in trade, and to an era of social peace and prosperity more durable than any other in modern European history.

The use of counterpart funds provides another example of how the Marshall Plan worked as a shared enterprise. These funds comprised the local currency equivalent of American grants, which the Economic Cooperation Act required participating countries to set aside in special accounts jointly controlled by the ECA and the governments involved. Such an arrangement forced both sides to negotiate their differences, which sometimes were considerable, and to reach an agreement that made expenditures possible. In Britain, counterpart funds were used to liquidate the Bank of England's short-term public debt. In the Netherlands, they helped to contain inflation, underwrite a program of land reclamation, and provide low-cost housing for industrial workers. In France, they supported the Monnet Plan for industrial modernization and reequipment. In Italy, they were earmarked for a variety of industrial and agricultural projects and for a public-works program to absorb part of the large pool of unemployed labor.

All across Europe, the landmarks of this joint enterprise still stand. In Berlin, Marshall aid reconstructed a power station that had earlier been dismantled as reparations. In Austria, it played a part in building the Limberg Dam and other components in a vast hydroelectric project. In Greece, it helped to reopen the Corinth Canal and restore the famous Orient Express, which once again linked Greece to Western Europe. And in other participating countries, it went to upgrade the manufacturing, mining, transportation, and communications industries. Some of the most notable projects included the Usinor steel mills and the Genissiat hydroelectric project in France, the Finsider and Falck steel plants in Italy, the Margram rolling mill in Great Britain, and the Donawitz and Linz steel mills in Austria.



The Path to Prosperity

This magnanimous support [the Marshall Plan] deserves above all to be assessed from the point of view of its moral effect. It gave the German people the feeling that they were no longer written off by the rest of the world but that they also could again take part in the progress of the free world. Its economic and finan-

cial significance was, moreover, no less. (Ludwig Erhard, Minister of Economics, 1949-1963, and Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1963-1966)

The spirit of cooperation evidenced in the execution of the Marshall Plan was born of more than need. Americans and Europeans were linked by a system of shared values. In the 20th century, a commitment to productiv-

ity formed part of the common culture, and one particularly important to a program of economic recovery. A lineal descendant of the Enlightenment, with its faith in reason, its commitment to science, and its belief in progress, the idea of productivity found fruitful expression in the technical assistance program that the ECA established in 1948. The goal was to promote industrial efficiency in Europe. The vehicles for achieving this goal included a variety of technical assistance projects, engineering schemes, and productivity surveys launched in Europe with the aid of American experts, and a host of productivity teams of European workers and managers who came to the United States to study agricultural and industrial production methods. Out of these efforts, all believed, would come a new day of economic progress and social stability in Europe.

By the middle of 1951, the ECA had expended nearly \$30 million on a dazzling array of technical assistance projects. In addition to projects that aimed at increasing efficiency and raising productivity in industry and agriculture, the list included a plan to expand electric power facilities in Greece, a program of veterinary research in Britain, and a number of schemes to improve public administration in Italy, Greece, and other participating countries.

By that time, moreover, hundreds of European productivity teams had toured the United States and scores of American experts had traveled to the participating countries and their overseas territories. The ECA maintained 372 experts overseas in the second quarter of 1951 alone and sponsored 145 productivity teams involving more than 1,000 European labor, management, and agricultural representatives. In addition, the ECA used technical assistance

funds to conduct seminars for European managers, to sponsor training programs for European engineers, and to distribute technical and scientific information through films, literature, and exhibits.

As in other areas, the Europeans cooperated in these projects and made a contribution of their own. Labor and management leaders from Great Britain and the United States organized the Anglo-American Council on Productivity.

Founded in 1948, the council's activities paralleled the ECA's technical assistance program, with the goal being to enlist American technology in the cause of British productivity. By the end of 1951, the council had sponsored visits to the United States by 66 British productivity teams, disseminated over 500,000 copies of their reports, and published major studies on standardization and simplification in industry.

Other participating countries followed this example. They organized national production councils and worked through the OEEC to launch an intra-European technical assistance program under which national groups of cooperating labor, management, and professional leaders began exchanging technical information and production data. The whole process, as a Dutch manufacturer said of the technical assistance program, opened the door to a "promising and fertile dissemination of American experience in handling productivity problems."

The results of this dissemination are impossible to estimate, but neither the ECA nor the participating countries doubted that technical assistance added measurably to Europe's economic revival. In France, technical assistance enhanced the Monnet Plan for industrial redevelopment. In Germany, it accelerated earlier trends toward the rationalization of industry.

In other countries, it led to improved engineering and marketing methods, to important technological adaptations, and to the spread of industrial planning, the growth of automation, and the better organization of production—all of which contributed substantially to the high rate of European productivity that persisted through the 1950s.

The integration of the Western European economies also looms as one of the great achievements of the postwar era and one for which the Marshall Plan can take a due share of credit. The architects of the Marshall Plan celebrated the benefits of economic integration and did what they could to bring it about. The strategic assumptions behind their policy held that an integrated economic order, particularly one headed by central institutions, would help to channel the revitalized strength of the Federal Republic of Germany in a constructive way. Economic integration would reconcile West Germany's recovery with the security concerns of her neighbors, thereby creating a unit of power in the West sufficient to contain Soviet power in the East. The economic assumptions grew fundamentally out of the American experience at home, where a large internal economy integrated by natural market forces and federal institutions had helped to make possible the gains in specialization, resource utilization, and productivity that inhere in economies of scale.

With these goals in mind, the designers of the Marshall Plan tried to strengthen the OEEC and liberalize intra-European trade, so that coordinated planning and normal market forces could weld separate economies into a single productive unit. They also encouraged the Council of Europe and helped to found the European Payments Union, forerunner of the European Monetary System. In addition, they

threw their weight behind the Schuman Plan (proposed in 1950) and the coal and steel community that grew out of it, just as they would support the larger European Economic Community that followed.

The Birth of a New Europe

The noble initiative of the Government of the United States is for our peoples an appeal which we cannot ignore without betraying them.

Together, then, we will make, and make it quickly, the effort of mutual self-aid which will make us worthy of being aided.

For generations, men of all countries who rejected a selfish nationalism have longed for this assembly which is being held today. Let us be proud to be witness to it and to be the good craftsmen of a task dreamed of for centuries and, at the present time, urgently necessary. (Georges Bidault, Foreign Minister of France, 1944-1946, 1947-1948, 1953-1954)

The Europeans were less enamored than the Americans with the integrative powers of the market. The British government rejected integration altogether, and the other participating governments refused to go as far in this direction as the Americans wanted. Nor did the Marshall Plan preclude the British from pursuing socialist policies, the French from adopting a modernization scheme that assigned the state a greater role than the Americans thought desirable, or the Germans and Italians from following fiscal and monetary strategies at odds with those favored in the ECA. American policy succeeded in large part because it encouraged participating countries to exercise a

high degree of autonomy within the framework of the Marshall Plan. Although an American plan, it placed a premium on European self-help and did not break down when the Europeans devised plans and programs of their own.

There were differences, to be sure, but they were always overshadowed by the common vision that bonded the American Marshall planners to their friends and allies on the other side of the Atlantic. Together, they saw a new Europe emerging from the rubble and the ruin of war with restored life and fresh vitality. And who can say that they did not go a long way toward turning the dream into reality? Viewed against the pattern of bilateralism that existed in 1947 or from the perspective of the Treaty of Rome concluded a decade later, it seems clear that recovery planners helped to set Western Europe on a road that led from the economic autarchy of the 1930s to the Common Market of the 1960s.

Nor was this the only gain. Through the OEEC and the Council of Europe, through the European Payments Union and the Schuman Plan, this generation of American and European policymakers also created an institutional framework that stood in lieu of a final peace settlement in the West. It was this framework that set the stage for a historic rapprochement between ancient enemies and led to West Germany's reintegration into the North Atlantic community.

The Marshall Plan, as defined by Marshall in his historic commencement address, was "directed . . . against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos." Measured against this criteria, it must be judged a great success. It succeeded in the revival of economic growth,

the containment of Soviet expansion, and the stabilization of democratic politics. It also laid a hardy foundation for transatlantic cooperation on a myriad of economic and political issues and for an Atlantic community that remains vital and growing today.

Lessons Learned

The Marshall Plan consisted essentially in vast-scale American aid to Europe. Its success depended entirely on the use the Europeans made of that aid. Driven by a will to renew, as well as by strong pressure from the Americans, they were able to put it to good use; that is, they concentrated their efforts on investment and exports, with only limited satisfaction of consumer wants, just enough to prevent social tensions from reaching the breaking point or, at any rate, from causing an acute crisis. (Robert Marjolin, Secretary-General, Organization for European Economic Cooperation, 1948-1955)

In the 50 years since George C. Marshall addressed the Harvard class of 1947, it has become commonplace to hear government leaders proclaim the need for another Marshall Plan to solve the intractable problem of economic development in the so-called Third World, to salvage what remains of the former Soviet Union, to forge a permanent peace in the Middle East, to shore up the unstable regimes in Eastern Europe, or to solve other difficult problems. Although the Marshall Plan was bound by historical circumstances that cannot be duplicated, it nonetheless lives on as a compelling symbol of international cooperation. Its results also testify to the resolve and generosity of the American people, to their capacity for disciplined sacrifice, to the

transformative power of their leadership, to their talent for organized initiative on a grand scale, and to their ability to collaborate with others in the pursuit of common goals.

But the Marshall Plan has more than symbolic value. It also offers some practical guides to the current and future generations, even at a time when America's power has diminished relative to its postwar pinnacle and when the American government is no longer able to mobilize economic resources on a scale comparable to those behind the Marshall Plan. After all, much of what the Marshall Plan accomplished came at little cost to the American taxpayer. The technical assistance program, which absorbed only a fraction of American aid, nonetheless put American technical, engineering, manufacturing, and marketing know-how behind the revitalization of the European economies. Similar programs could bring comparable benefits to the developing world today, and their prospects for success would only increase if they embodied the same spirit of cooperation that infused so much of the Marshall Plan.

Virtually every part of the Marshall Plan stressed the principle of European self-help and involved Europeans and Americans as partners in the job of reconstruction. Nor was cooperation limited to political leaders and government officials. It was part of the genius of the Marshall Plan that cooperation at the government level went hand-in-hand with a private, trans-European and transatlantic pattern of collaboration that involved leaders from business, labor, agriculture, and academia. This kind of cooperation not only undergirded the recovery program in Europe, but also accounted for its success in the United States, where the same combination of private groups helped to educate the American people about

the need for European stabilization and won support for the Marshall Plan on Capitol Hill.

The Marshall Plan institutionalized that cooperation in innovative organizations that guaranteed the success of the enterprise and could well be emulated today. Though a government creation, the Economic Cooperation Administration functioned as a semi-private agency staffed by experts drawn from the professions, just as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, itself an invention of the participating governments, functioned in part as a denationalized agency run by a professional staff of international civil servants who enjoyed an important degree of autonomy from national governments. Similar thinking informed the European Payments Union, not to mention the European Coal and Steel Community that American and European leaders saw as a supranational mechanism for integrating and regulating competing European economies. These institutions and their successors stand not only as part of the Marshall Plan's legacy but also as examples of an international leadership that can dampen the forces of nationalism, harmonize differences, and produce positive results today, as they did in the early years of the postwar period.

An even more useful legacy is to be found in the high degree of tolerance that characterized American policy under the Marshall Plan. To be sure, the Marshall Plan had no room for the communist political parties in Europe or for the communist-dominated trade unions. Nor did the plan leave room for active participation by the Soviet Union. Cooperation was limited largely to the countries of Central and Western Europe and to democratic or anti-communist political forces. Within these limits, however, the American Marshall planners were capable of working with their European

Blueprint for Recovery

partners in a way that stopped short of dictating terms. Try as they might to push Great Britain into an integrated Western European economy, the Marshall planners had to pull back when the British refused to go along, just as they had to give way when the French, German, or Italian governments refused to dismantle cartels, revise tax policies, implement progressive social reforms, or take some of the other initiatives urged by the ECA. As important as these goals were to American leaders, they did not justify a hard-headed intervention into European affairs. Nor would American leaders permit the wrangling over these initiatives to disrupt the spirit of cooperation that otherwise characterized the Marshall Plan, especially the collaborative efforts to realize such important common goals as the liberalization of European trade, the conversion of European currencies, the integration of markets, the building of supranational institutions, the reconciliation of Franco-German differences, and the creation of a continental balance of power that could contain the Soviet Union.

The Marshall Plan may have created a postwar order in Western Europe and the transatlantic area favorable to American interests, but it was a collaborative order that involved the Europeans as full partners and that gave them the greatest voice in their own affairs. More than anything else, it was this spirit of collaboration and tolerance, this emphasis on self-help and mutual aid, that accounted for the

success of the Marshall Plan and that stands as a great lesson to the current generation.

The material assistance and the moral encouragement provided by the Marshall Plan brought a powerful new impetus to the campaign for European unity. In fact, it can be said that the American policy of economic aid, coupled with the pressure of the communist danger, created conditions in which, for the first time, the unification of Europe became a practical possibility. (The Council of Europe, 1949)

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Reflections: Miles to Go.

From American Plan to European Union

by Helmut Schmidt

Three speeches had a decisive impact on the economic and political rehabilitation of Europe after World War II: Winston Churchill's in Zurich in 1946 about a United States of Europe; George Marshall's at Harvard in 1947, offering American aid to Europeans struggling to escape their postwar predicament; and Robert Schuman's in Paris in 1950, proposing communal control of Europe's coal and steel resources. It would, of course, be unfair and historically inaccurate to credit these three men alone with Europe's successful revival. Many other leaders were instrumental in rebuilding the continent, and if not for Stalin's imperialism, many courageous acts in the United States and Western Europe, among them Secretary of State Marshall's plan, would have gone undone.

To understand the effects of the Marshall Plan, one must first comprehend what life was like for ordinary Germans, like me, toward the end of World War II and in those first turbulent years afterward. We had lost. I had been convinced for several years that we would, and many of my comrades in Germany's armed forces had reached a similar conclusion. During the day, we fulfilled our missions on the battlefield; at night, we hoped for a quick defeat of our own country. After the Battle of the Bulge in late 1944, when my division was driven out of Belgium and Luxembourg, I complained to my commander about Germany's war strategy: prudence dictated that we concentrate our energies on the Soviets in the East, and in the West let the Americans occupy as much German soil as they wanted. Although he angrily rejected my suggestion, he did not report me.

I had imagined that when we lost the war we Germans would have to live in caves and holes

in the ground, but this apocalyptic vision turned out to be much worse than our actual conditions. True, we struggled for coal and food; there were days during the winter of 1946-47 when we stayed in bed because there was nothing to eat and nothing to burn for warmth. Divided into four zones and occupied by the Allies, Germany was in agony. Its remaining industrial capacity was being dismantled, unemployment was rising, and the black market was the only market. But my generation, cut off from the rest of the world since adolescence, had a great desire for knowledge and for a new beginning. I studied economics, while my wife taught in a secondary school.

Germans who grew up in the 1930s—I was 14 when Hitler came to power in 1933—did not know much about the rest of the world. Our knowledge of America was limited to the little we were taught in school: the Monroe Doctrine, the U.S. role in the First World War, Black Friday on the New York Stock Exchange. When the war broke out, my ideas about economic and social conditions in the United States did not have a positive cast. Only the widespread anti-American propaganda made me suspect that the United States must have some virtues; otherwise, why would Goebbels go to such trouble to debase it in our eyes? I do not remember Churchill's or Marshall's noted pronouncements from the postwar years, but I do recall a speech in Stuttgart in September 1946 by the American secretary of state, James Byrnes. For the first time, a Western political leader projected positive, if vague, views about Germany's future.

Pax Americana

In June 1948 the American, British, and French occupation authorities replaced the hopelessly inflated reichsmark with a new cur-

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rency, the deutsche mark. Together with the gradual abandoning of the ration-card economy, this reform ushered in a totally different state of economic affairs. Until then, we had lived on the meager rations our cards got us, and money did not really matter, except

about: bread, butter, fruit, even coffee and cigarettes.

This monetary and economic revolution would never have transpired had it not been for the Marshall Plan. The American aid program be-



in the shadows, where one paid six reichsmark for a single cigarette. Now money became all-important. The ration cards slowly disappeared over the next two years, and shops began to fill with goods we had only dreamed

came operational in [Western] Germany in the summer of 1948, about the time the deutsche mark was put in place. The Japanese currency reform of 1946 had largely failed, while that in Germany had succeeded, and the difference

was the Marshall Plan. The American, British, and French zones of occupation in Western Germany merged in 1949 to become the Federal Republic, and the new state was a success within a decade. I had been raised an Anglophile, but over the course of the 1950s the United States became my most-favored nation.

In 1953 I was elected to the West German parliament, the Bundestag. At the time, the Soviet military threat loomed large, and many feared that Communist parties might take over parts of Western Europe, as they had to the east. The Berlin airlift of 1948-49 and the formation in 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which West Germany joined six years later, alleviated the first concern, convincing me that the United States, Canada, and their European allies had irrevocably decided to jointly defend Western Europe in case of attack. We appreciated the risk the American government had assumed and saw the United States as the military, political, and economic anchor of the security and well-being of Western Europe. The United States had proved itself a generous nation, standing by its commitments and fulfilling its promises. "Pax Americana" seemed to me an accurate description of the age, and we Germans turned in hope and faith to the United States. Yet we were troubled by a nagging concern: the strategy of massive nuclear retaliation, which the United States had adopted during the Eisenhower administration, implied that in case of war against the Soviet Union, Germany would become a major battleground.

As the postwar recovery continued, it became clear that the market-oriented Western European economies, founded on the basis of free, private enterprise, had a far more promising future than the communist command economies of the Soviet Union, East Germany, and the rest of Eastern Europe. At the same time,

European integration struck me as necessary, less for economic than political reasons. After the disastrous wars of the past hundred years, in which Germany had played a key role—the Napoleonic Wars, Bismarck's war against France, and two world wars—I believed it desirable to bind my country into a greater European entity to prevent the recurrence of such conflict. I became a proponent of the French political economist Jean Monnet's step-by-step approach that would tie France as well as Germany into the European Economic Community.

No Grand Plan

Reflecting on the late 1940s and the decades that followed, one could come to the superficial conclusion that the Cold War had proceeded according to some master plan: The Marshall Plan was established, NATO and the European Community were formed, the Soviet empire collapsed, Eastern Europe was liberated, Germany was reunified. But history is far more complicated, for the chain of events included several crises that might have erupted in war. That outcome was averted thanks to leaders who did not act according to plan, but instead relied on their moral and national visions as well as their common sense. Our understanding of the Cold War must reserve a central place for historical contingency and skilled statecraft.

Had British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin not enthusiastically embraced the Marshall Plan, and had Britain and France not quickly coordinated the economic activities of the recipient countries, Marshall's idea might never have become reality. Had German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer capitulated to political pressure rather than stubbornly pursue his vision, the Schuman Plan and German membership in and

contributions to NATO might not have come to pass. Had Harry Truman not reacted courageously and John Kennedy prudently, the two Berlin crises—the Soviet blockade in the late 1940s and the erection of the wall in 1961, which cut the city in two—might not have been overcome. Had Kennedy and his team not sensitively handled the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, it could have set the world afire. If not for the insights and efforts of Jean Monnet and later Charles de Gaulle, France and Germany might never have been reconciled.

If not for the Helsinki Act of 1975, which called for the protection of human rights throughout Europe and was signed by Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev and all the other communist dictators, the dissident movements led by Lech Walesa in Poland, Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia, and Andrei Sakharov in Russia might never have emerged and persisted. Helsinki would not have occurred without West Germany's Ostpolitik—*détente* with the Eastern Bloc—a policy whose rationale many in the West doubted at first. China would perhaps not have grown to be a rational world power had Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger not seized the opening in the early 1970s and had Deng Xiaoping not unexpectedly pursued economic reforms while maintaining a firm grasp on power. And finally, the tensions within the Soviet Union might have resulted in outward aggression rather than the empire's implosion if not for Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost*.

The United States, the Soviet Union, France, Britain, China, Japan, indeed most countries—including my own—did not pursue consistent and clear strategies over the last 50 years. Over that half-century, the perceptions and aspirations of political elites everywhere changed. New leaders came to power with

new goals. Sometimes the process took decades, as with the momentous reversal of imperialism under Gorbachev. Sometimes it took just a few years, like the transformation from Mao Zedong's disastrous policies to Deng's "socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics."

De Gaulle vetoed Harold Macmillan's effort to bring Britain into the European Community, but less than a decade later, another British prime minister, Edward Heath, succeeded because the next French president, Georges Pompidou, was not opposed [to Britain entering the European Community]. John Kennedy led his country into tragedy in Vietnam, and only after many years of humiliation was Ronald Reagan able finally to restore American self-esteem and pride. But Reagan's Republican Party showed little respect for the United Nations, which America had helped design and build after World War II.

The entrepreneurial and financial elites have changed their views as well. Under Roosevelt's aegis, John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White created the Bretton Woods system, which made the American dollar the keystone of the global financial system. A quarter-century later, Nixon took the dollar off the gold standard, unintentionally sparking instability in exchange rates and opening the door to unprecedented speculation in the financial markets. A new capitalist attitude arose, first in America but quickly spreading all over Europe, which put "shareholder value" above loyalty to a corporation's employees and clients and in some cases even one's country. Today the question seems to be: What can I do for my business and thereby for myself? In the United States and especially in Europe, governments see their powers challenged by multinational corporations, and tax evasion has become com-

mon. And the globalization of financial services weakens governments' ability to control speculative escapades.

The False Promise of Aid

The United States and Europe have fared much better than anyone imagined at the time of the Marshall Plan. They have produced leaders who have guided them smoothly through many unforeseen events and crises. Aldous Huxley's "brave new world" is not in the making, and neither Oswald Spengler's "decline of the West" nor Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" is unavoidable.

But grave problems, very different from those of the postwar years, lie ahead. The world's population has quadrupled in the last century, and the explosion will continue, bringing still greater misery to much of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The demographic tension is already beginning to lead to wars and mass emigration to North America and Europe. Not since the end of World War II has the world seen so many millions of refugees.

The Marshall Plan is hardly the model for a solution to these coming challenges in the developing world. Over the last 50 years, the developed world has spent huge sums on development aid and the World Bank has been very active, but, with a small number of exceptions, these efforts have not been successful. Megacities, marked by poverty and violence, are mushrooming throughout the developing world. Marshall aid was successful because Europe possessed a long-standing entrepreneurial heritage, a base of business acumen, a high level of general education, and technological knowledge as well as engineering capabilities. No Marshall

Plan can succeed where such prerequisites do not exist.

A large-scale Marshall Plan for Russia would probably fail because many years must pass before Russia will generate the entrepreneurial skills and develop the personal experience in decision-making among managers and employees. By contrast, China does not need such an aid program, thanks largely to the entrepreneurial heritage cultivated in the 60 million overseas Chinese, many of whom are now loyally investing in the mother country, despite its communist regime. Western corporations have followed their example, adding to the infusion of capital. In Central Europe, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland are on a satisfactory course toward industrial and financial development, and the three Baltic republics are hopefully beginning to move down that path. But many other countries in Eastern Europe and on the Balkan Peninsula are in dire need of help, for neither democracy nor entrepreneurship has significant roots there.

It all comes down to one basic truth: Aid will be successful only where the possibility of self-help exists or can be revived. Otherwise, these efforts will be limited to mere charity.

The Integration Imperative

By the next century, there will likely be three superpowers: the United States; Russia, for in spite of its present weakness and foreseeable crises, the country still possesses enormous territory, rich mineral resources hitherto only partially explored and even less exploited, and military might, including great strategic nuclear capabilities; and China, which has an enormous population, soon to number 1.3 billion, a strong and growing economy that will make

it the world's largest exporter within three decades, a highly trained and well-equipped military, and great influence in Asia and the Pacific Rim. Both Russia and China, however, may not achieve this status: Russia's great challenge is simply maintaining its cohesion, and China must build the necessary infrastructure in the inner provinces and avoid conflict between the poor interior and the well-to-do seaboard. Japan may also deserve a place among the superpowers thanks to its huge reserves of capital as well as net capital exports, but only if the Japanese can maintain their outstanding savings rate.

As this new world emerges, what will Europe's role and weight in international affairs be? Neither Britain nor France is a world power any longer, even if they find this difficult to admit to themselves. Italy ceased to be a world power when the Germanic barbarians destroyed the Roman Empire. And, after losing two world wars and constraining itself within a web of European institutions, Germany will never again become a world power. None of the European nation-states will be sufficiently influential to pursue its national interests alone as the world comes to terms with the oncoming global paradigm shift and attempts to address the host of issues that will arise over the control of financial markets, over exchange rates, freedom of trade, arms control, limits on population growth, and the deterioration of the environment and the oceans. Only a vital European Union will have the political, economic, and financial weight to exert an influence on global affairs equal to that of the three superpowers. This perception is gaining ground among the leaders of the EU, and it provides an additional strategic motivation for European integration.

When Churchill spoke of the United States of Europe in 1946, he clearly had two strategic

motives in mind: a barrier against Soviet imperialism and protection from future German expansion. Given the current weakness of Russia, Churchill's first concern is no longer relevant, but the second remains valid. In 1946 West Germany had some 40 million inhabitants, and by 1989 it had a population of more than 60 million, largely because of the influx of German refugees from the East. Since reunification, Germany's population is over 80 million, almost one-and-a-half times that of Britain or France and double that of Poland. Germany's preponderance in Europe poses a potential threat to the stability of the continent, and it must be bound into Europe-wide institutions, as Monnet and de Gaulle understood, and French President Jacques Chirac understands today.

During the 1960s the Common Market enabled the six participating countries—France, Italy, West Germany, and the three Benelux countries—to grow faster economically than the European countries outside the European Community. The EC's economic success has led eight additional countries to join the community since the early 1970s: Ireland, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Austria, Sweden, and Finland. The quest for economic advantage is the third strategic motive for European integration. Only Britain joined the EC for a different reason: to retain her influence over European affairs.

A fourth strategic motive, maintaining European influence in world affairs, is becoming ever more important. In the postwar period America fostered European integration because it furthered U.S. strategic interests. It was also natural that during the Cold War, West Germany participated in the integration process while maintaining a close relationship with the United States, since Germany's security

ultimately rested more on the United States than on its European allies. Because of this basic strategic reality, de Gaulle never succeeded in enticing Germany away from the United States. During nine years of very close personal cooperation with my French friend Valéry Giscard d'Estaing—first as ministers of finance, and then as France's head of state and West Germany's federal chancellor he and I carefully avoided letting Germany's strategic preference be called into question.

But today, Germany no longer lives under the Soviet threat, and Russia will not in the future occupy as important a place in German strategic thought. Naturally, NATO and the alliance with the United States no longer have the same influence on German grand strategy. Germany will remain in the alliance, but European integration—further development of the EU and close cooperation with France—is increasingly important. Germany remains thankful to the United States for the help and encouragement it received throughout the Cold War, and America can rely on this gratitude. On the other hand, the United States must understand that in the next century Germany will not automatically take its side in disputes between Washington and Paris. Germany's vital interest dictates that it not become isolated or insulated from its European neighbors, and France is the most important [neighbor]. It was France that first extended its hand in reconciliation with its traditional German enemy, and the two countries are now striving for a common European currency as both attempt to overcome mass unemployment. Other steps will follow: enlargement of the union, deeper and stronger EU institutions and infrastructure, and, later, a common foreign and security policy.

This process will of course experience crises and failures, as many as have plagued integra-

tion since 1954, when the French parliament voted down the creation of a European Defense Community. But I am confident that France and Germany possess sufficient political will and ability to overcome all such future crises. The basic strategic motives underlying integration will carry more weight than any transitory conflicts that might arise out of domestic politics, ideology, or vanity.

The European Union still has far to go. It is an undertaking unique in the history of humankind. Union members are, all of us, determined to maintain our different national languages, heritages, and identities. Nevertheless, we are joining together, not because of a dictator or conqueror, not because of one superior power, but because of our common belief that a strong and vital EU will best serve our respective national interests, however great the global transformations of the next century.

Some Americans frown on this prospect. They suspect that the new currency, the Euro, will detract from the importance of the American dollar. They suspect that a common EU foreign policy will weaken the hitherto dominant American influence over Europe's foreign policy. But they should rest assured that Europeans will remain committed to the values that they share with Americans: democracy, human rights, the freedom and dignity of the individual, and justice. Europe and America are closely linked by history, religious belief, philosophy and literature, as well as by civic, democratic, and economic norms. These bonds will last. And the United States ought not to forget that the emerging European Union is one of its own greatest achievements: It would never have happened without the Marshall Plan.

Helmut Schmidt was Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from 1974 to 1982.

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright's Commencement Address at Harvard University

**Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts
June 5, 1997**

[. . .]

I am delighted to be here on this day of celebration and rededication. To those of you who are here from the class of '97, I say congratulations, you may be in debt, but you made it.

As a former professor and current mother, I confess to loving graduation days, especially when they are accompanied by an honorary degree. I love the ceremony, I love the academic settings and—although it will be difficult for me today—let's be honest, I love to daydream during the commencement speech. Graduations are unique among the milestones of our lives because they celebrate past accomplishments while also anticipating the future. That is true for each of the graduates today. And it is true for the United States.

During the past few years, we seem to have observed the fiftieth anniversary of everything. Through media and memory, we have again been witness to paratroopers filling the skies over Normandy, the liberation of Buchenwald, a sailor's kiss in Times Square, an Iron Curtain descending, and Jackie Robinson sliding home.

Today, we recall another turning point in that era. For on this day fifty years ago, Secretary of State George Marshall addressed the graduating students of this university. He spoke to a class enriched by many who had fought for freedom and deprived of many who had fought for freedom and died. The Secretary's words were plain, but his message reached far beyond the audience assembled in this yard to

an American people weary of war and wary of new commitments and to a Europe where life-giving connections between farm and market, enterprise and capital, hope and future had been severed.

Secretary Marshall did not adorn his rhetoric with high-flown phrases, saying only that it would be logical for America to help restore "normal economic health to the world, without which there could be no political stability and no assured peace." He did not attach to his plan the label "Made in America," but rather invited European ideas and required European countries to do all they could to help themselves. His vision was inclusive, leaving the door open to participation by all, including the Soviet Union, and—so there would be no repetition of the punitive peace of Versailles—also to Germany.

British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin called the Marshall Plan a "lifeline to sinking men," and it was, although I expect some women in Europe were equally appreciative. By extending that lifeline, America helped unify Europe's west around democratic principles and planted seeds of a transatlantic partnership that would soon blossom in the form of NATO and the cooperative institutions of a new Europe.

Just as important was the expression of American leadership that the Marshall Plan conveyed. After World War I, America had withdrawn from the world, shunning responsibility and avoiding risk. Others did the same. The result in the heart of Europe was the rise of great evil. After the devastation of World War II and the soul-withering horror of the Holocaust, it was not enough to say that the enemy had been vanquished—that what we were against had failed. The generation of Marshall, Truman and Vandenberg was determined to

build a lasting peace. The message that generation conveyed from the White House, from both parties on Capitol Hill, and from people across our country who donated millions in relief cash, clothing and food, was that, this time, America would not turn inward, America would lead.

Today, in the wake of the Cold War, it is not enough for us to say that communism has failed. We, too, must heed the lessons of the past, accept responsibility and lead. Because we are entering a century in which there will be many interconnected centers of population, power and wealth, we cannot limit our focus, as Marshall did in his speech, to the devastated battleground of a prior war. Our vision must encompass not one, but every continent.

Unlike Marshall's generation, we face no single galvanizing threat. The dangers we confront are less visible and more diverse, some as old as ethnic conflict, some as new as letter bombs, some as subtle as climate change, and some as deadly as nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands. To defend against these threats, we must take advantage of the historic opportunity that now exists to bring the world together in an international system based on democracy, open markets, law and a commitment to peace.

We know that not every nation is yet willing or able to play its full part in this system. One group is still in transition from centralized planning and totalitarian rule. Another has only begun to dip its toes into economic and political reform. Some nations are still too weak to participate in a meaningful way. And a few countries have regimes that actively oppose the premises upon which this system is based.

Because the situation we face today is different from that confronted by Marshall's generation, we cannot always use the same means, but we can summon the same spirit. We can strive for the same sense of bipartisanship that allowed America in Marshall's day to present to both allies and adversaries a united front. We can invest the resources needed to keep America strong economically, militarily and diplomatically, recognizing, as did Marshall, that these strengths reinforce each other. We can act with the same knowledge that, in our era, American security and prosperity are linked to economic and political health abroad. And we can recognize, even as we pay homage to the heroes of history, that we have our own duty to be authors of history.

Let every nation acknowledge, today, the opportunity to be part of an international system based on democratic principles is available to all. This was not the case 50 years ago. Then, my father's boss Jan Masaryk—foreign minister of what was then Czechoslovakia—was told by Stalin in Moscow that his country must not participate in the Marshall Plan despite its national interest in doing so. Upon his return to Prague, Masaryk said it was at that moment he understood that he was employed by a government no longer sovereign in its own land. Today, there is no Stalin to give orders. If a nation is isolated from the international community now, it is either because the country is simply too weak to meet international standards or because its leaders have chosen willfully to disregard those standards.

Last week, in the Netherlands, President Clinton said that no democratic nation in Europe would be left out of the transatlantic community. Today, I say that no nation in the world need be left out of the global system we are constructing. Every nation that seeks to partici-

Madeleine K. Albright's Commencement Address

pate and is willing to do all it can to help itself will have America's help in finding the right path:

- In Africa, poverty, disease, disorder and misrule have cut off millions from the international system. But Africa is a continent rich both in human and natural resources. Today, its best new leaders are pursuing reforms that are helping private enterprise and democratic institutions to gain a foothold. Working with others, we must lend momentum by maintaining our assistance, encouraging investment, lowering the burden of debt and striving to create successful models for others to follow.
- In Latin America and the Caribbean, integration is much further advanced. Nations throughout our hemisphere are expanding commercial ties, fighting crime, working to raise living standards, and cooperating to ensure that economic and political systems endure.
- In Asia and the Pacific, we see a region that not only has joined the international system, but also has become a driving force behind it; a region that is home to eight of the ten fastest growing economies in the world. With our allies, we have worked to ease the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear program and invited that country to end its self-imposed isolation. And we have encouraged China to expand participation in the international system and to observe international norms on everything from human rights to the export of arms-related technologies.
- Finally, in Europe, we are striving to fulfill the vision Marshall proclaimed but the Cold War prevented, the vision of a Europe whole

and free, united as President Clinton said this past week, "not by the force of arms but by the possibilities of peace."

Where half a century ago, American leadership helped lift Western Europe to prosperity and democracy, so today, the entire transatlantic community is helping Europe's newly free nations fix their economies and cement the rule of law. Next month [July 1997], in Madrid, NATO will invite new members from among the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, while keeping the door to future membership open to others. This will not—as some fear—create a new source of division within Europe. On the contrary, it is erasing the unfair and unnatural line imposed half a century ago. And it is giving nations an added incentive to settle territorial disputes, respect minority and human rights, and complete the process of reform.

NATO is a defensive alliance that harbors no territorial ambitions. It does not regard any state as its adversary, certainly not a democratic and reforming Russia that is intent on integrating with the West and with which it has forged a historic partnership [the NATO-Russia Founding Act], signed in Paris just nine days ago [May 27, 1997].

Today, from Ukraine to the United States, and from Reykjavik to Ankara, we are demonstrating that the quest for European security is no longer a zero sum game. NATO has new allies and partners. The nations of Central and Eastern Europe are rejoining in practice the community of values they never left in spirit. The Russian people will have something they have not had in centuries—a genuine and sustainable peace with the nations to their west.

The Cold War's shadow no longer darkens Europe, but one specter from the past does

remain. History teaches us that there is no natural geographic or political endpoint to conflict in the Balkans, where World War I began and where the worst European violence of the past half century occurred in this decade. That is why the peaceful integration of Europe will not be complete until the Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia are fulfilled.

When defending the boldness of the Marshall Plan 50 years ago, Senator Arthur Vandenberg observed that it does little good to extend a 15 foot rope to a man drowning 20 feet away. Similarly, we cannot achieve our objectives in Bosnia by doing just enough to avoid immediate war; we must do all we can to help the people of Bosnia achieve permanent peace. In recent days, President Clinton has approved steps to make the peace process irreversible and to give each party a clear stake in its success. This past weekend, I went to the region to deliver in person the message that if the parties want international acceptance or our aid, they must meet their commitments, including full cooperation with the international war crimes tribunal.

That tribunal represents a choice not only for Bosnia, and for Rwanda, but for the world. We can accept atrocities as inevitable, or we can strive for a higher standard. We can presume to forget what only God and the victims have standing to forgive, or we can heed the most searing lesson of this century, which is that evil—when unopposed—will spawn more evil.

The majority of Bosnia killings occurred not in battle but in markets, streets and playgrounds where men and women like you and me, and boys and girls like those we know, were abused or murdered not because of anything they had done, but simply for who they were. We all have a stake in establishing a precedent

that will deter future atrocities, in helping the tribunal make a lasting peace easier by separating the innocent from the guilty, in holding accountable the perpetrators of ethnic cleansing, and in seeing that those who consider rape just another tactic of war answer for their crimes.

Since George Marshall's time, the United States has played the leading role within the international system, not as sole arbiter of right and wrong, for that is a responsibility widely shared, but as pathfinder—as the nation able to show the way when others cannot. In the years immediately after World War II, America demonstrated that leadership not only through the Marshall Plan, but also through the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin airlift and the response to communist aggression in Korea. In this decade, America led in defeating Saddam Hussein, encouraging nuclear stability on the Korean Peninsula and in the former Soviet Union, restoring elected leaders in Haiti, negotiating the Dayton Accords, and supporting the peacemakers over the bomb throwers in the Middle East and other strategic regions.

We welcome this leadership role not, in Teddy Roosevelt's phrase, because we wish to be "an international Meddlesome Matty" but because we know from experience that our interests and those of our allies may be affected by regional or civil wars, power vacuums that create opportunities for criminals and terrorists and threats to democracy.

But America cannot do the job alone. We can point the way and find the path, but others must be willing to come along and take responsibility for their own affairs. Others must be willing to act within the bounds of their own resources and capabilities to join in building a world in which shared economic growth

Madeleine K. Albright's Commencement Address

is possible, violent conflicts are constrained and those who abide by the law are progressively more secure.

While in Sarajevo, I visited a playground in the area once known as "snipers' alley," where many Bosnians had earlier been killed because of ethnic hate. This past weekend, the children were playing there without regard to whether the child in the next swing was Muslim, Serb or Croat. They thanked America for helping to fix their swings and asked me to place in the soil a plant which they promised to nourish and tend. It struck me then that this was an apt metaphor for America's role fifty years ago when we planted the seeds of renewed prosperity and true democracy in Europe. And [it was] a metaphor for America's role during the remaining years of this century and into the next.

As this great university has recognized—in the foreign students it has attracted, the research it conducts, the courses it offers and the sensibility it conveys—those of you who have graduated today will live global lives. You will compete in a world marketplace; travel further and more often than any previous generation; share ideas, tastes and experiences with counterparts from every culture; and recognize that to have a full and rewarding future, you will have to look outwards.

As you do, and as our country does, we must aspire to the high standard set by Marshall, using means adapted to our time based on values that endure for all time, and never forgetting that America belongs on the side of freedom. I say this to you as Secretary of State. I say it also as one of the many people whose lives have been shaped by the turbulence of Europe during the middle of this century and by the leadership of America throughout this century.

I can still remember, in England during the war, sitting in the bomb shelter, singing away the fear, thanking God for American help. I can still remember, after the war and after the communist takeover in Prague, arriving here in the United States where I wanted only to be accepted and to make my parents and my new country proud. Because my parents fled in time, I escaped Hitler. To our shared and constant sorrow, millions did not.

Because of America's generosity, I escaped Stalin. Millions did not. Because of the vision of the Truman-Marshall generation, I have been privileged to live my life in freedom. Millions have still never had that opportunity.

It may be hard for you, who have no memory of that time 50 years ago, to understand. But it is necessary that you try to understand. Over the years, many have come to think of World War II as the last "good war;" for, if ever a cause was just, that was it; and if ever the future of humanity stood in the balance, it was then.

Two full generations of Americans have grown up since that war, first mine, now yours. Two generations of boys and girls who have seen the veterans at picnics and parades and fireworks, saluting, with medals and ribbons on their chests, seeing the pride in their bearing and thinking perhaps: "What a fine thing it must have been to be tested in a great cause and to have prevailed." Today of all days, let us not forget that behind each medal and ribbon, there is a story of heroism, yes, but also profound sadness, for World War II was not a good war.

From North Africa to Salerno, from Normandy to the Bulge to Berlin, an entire continent lost to Fascism had to be taken back village by

village, hill by hill. Further eastward, from Tarawa to Okinawa, the death-struggle for Asia was an assault against dug-in positions, surmounted only by unbelievable courage at unbearable loss.

Today, the greatest danger to America is not some foreign enemy; it is the possibility that we will fail to heed the example of that generation, that we will allow the momentum towards democracy to stall, that we will take for granted the institutions and principles upon which our own freedom is based, and that we will forget what the history of this century reminds us: that problems abroad if left unattended, will all too often come home to America.

A decade or two from now, we will be known as the neo-isolationists who allowed tyranny and lawlessness to rise again or as the generations that solidified the global triumph of democratic principles. We will be known as the neo-protectionists whose lack of vision produced financial meltdown or as the generations that laid the groundwork for rising pros-

perity around the world. We will be known as the world-class ditherers who stood by while the seeds of renewed global conflict were sown or as the generations that took strong measures to forge alliances, deter aggression and keep the peace.

There is no certain roadmap to success, either for individuals or for generations. Ultimately, it is a matter of judgment, a question of choice. In making that choice, let us remember that there is not a page of American history of which we are proud that was authored by a chronic complainer or prophet of despair. We are doers.

We have a responsibility in our time, as others have had in theirs, not to be prisoners of history, but to shape history; a responsibility to fill the role of pathfinder, and to build with others a global network of purpose and law that will protect our citizens, defend our interests, preserve our values and bequeath to future generations a legacy as proud as the one we honor today. To that mission, I pledge my own best efforts and summon yours.

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Excerpt from Chancellor Helmut Kohl's Statement to the German Bundestag on the 50th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan

Bonn, Germany
June 12, 1997

Mrs. President, ladies and gentlemen,

[. . .] June 5, marked the 50th anniversary of the day on which U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall made his famous speech at Harvard. In it he proposed the provision of comprehensive assistance to a Europe destroyed by war. This assistance changed the face of Europe and with it the face of Germany.

Last week I had the opportunity to attend the commemorative festivities for the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan in Washington. I used the occasion to once again express to the American people Germany's gratitude for this assistance.

I think it is fitting and proper to reiterate this thanks here in front of the German Bundestag. We will never forget what the people of the United States of America did for us Germans.

Although I express this gratitude primarily in remembrance of former U.S. President Harry S. Truman and his Secretary of State George Marshall, at the same time it is directed to the many Americans who helped us in a time of great need through a variety of package-sending and fund-raising campaigns.

George Marshall's speech will always be remembered as a testament to the wisdom, the prudence and, above all, the generosity of the American people. For Europe and particularly for us in Germany [the Marshall Plan] involved more than economic aid.

Marshall's speech was first and foremost a message of solidarity. It stated that the United

States of America would not abandon Europe leaving it to fend for itself. At the same time, it [Marshall's speech] challenged Europeans to join forces and, more importantly, to help themselves. [. . .]

In Western Europe and in Western Germany, George Marshall's speech had a powerful psychological effect that is difficult to imagine today. The victor joined hands with the vanquished offering help and reconciliation. When in history has anything comparable occurred? A few years later Konrad Adenauer rightly referred to this example of moral grandeur as "one of the greatest deeds of a nation."

[. . .]

I remember well the situation in 1947. I was seventeen years old at the time. For the majority of Germans today, who know the postwar years only from hearsay, it is hard to imagine the extreme conditions people were then faced with. Out of necessity, many people lived in the basements of bombed-out buildings. Refugees poured into already overcrowded cities. In many areas, production had come to a standstill. People were often so hungry that they were too weak to take care of even the most basic of human needs. [. . .]

George Marshall's speech showed the way out of this desperate situation and pointed to a better future. On behalf of President Truman, he announced the objective of helping the war-torn countries of Europe return to economic stability and independence. American policy, he said, was "directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos." For the United States it was a logical necessity to help the nations [of Europe] return to a healthy

economic development. Only in this way were political stability and peace in the world possible.

[. . .]

At the same time it [Marshall's speech] made clear that America was not going to repeat the devastating mistake it made after World War I of withdrawing from Europe and returning to a policy of isolationism. Marshall also had in mind the creation of an independent, stable world economy. He wanted to restore the international division of labor that had been destroyed by the war.

[. . .]

In the four years of the Marshall Plan, the United States supported Europe with a total of approximately \$13.3 billion, of which some \$1.4 billion went to Germany. To put these figures in perspective, at the peak of the Marshall Plan in 1948 and 1949 U.S. aid amounted to a renunciation for Americans of more than two percent of their gross national product. Between 1948 and 1951, nearly half of the exports to Europe were financed by American taxpayers. As of 1952, every American had contributed about \$80 to the reconstruction program. At the time that was more than an average week's pay.

[. . .]

For the economy, as well, the American offer was more than just material support. At a time in Germany when one could buy more with cigarettes than with money, the Marshall Plan symbolized the very important elements of stability and security. It [the Marshall Plan] also made a key contribution to the success of the currency reform in 1948. In the following

years, the Marshall Plan helped modernize our industry and thus contributed significantly to sparking economic growth.

The American aid strategy had still deeper effects on Germany. More than just donations were involved; recipients had to pay for the goods with counterpart funds. By this means, a market-appropriate distribution of funds was ensured. Through ERP counterpart funds a capital stock could be created from which German industry still benefits today. Since 1949 some 105 billion deutsche mark in loans have been provided from ERP funds.

In connection with German unification, ERP funds once again took on special importance. Since 1990 loans granted have more than doubled and in 1997 amount[ed] to approximately 13 billion deutsche mark. From 1990 to 1996, 51 billion deutsche mark in loans were made for investments in former East Germany, where they resulted in an investment volume of more than 150 billion deutsche mark.

[. . .]

The Marshall Plan also meant a new beginning in our relationships with our neighbors. America showed us the way back into the community of free nations and supported us in the first difficult steps along this path.

At the same time—and this was a matter of major importance—the United States of America brought the countries of Europe closer together. The American government required the recipient countries in Europe to consult with each other regarding the granting of American aid and to cooperate with one another. The Europeans themselves were to take the initiative and formulate their needs together.

The recipient countries put together a joint committee to formulate a response to George Marshall's proposal. In 1948—not quite three years after the end of World War II—the OEEC, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation, was founded.

[. . .]

I would like to take this opportunity to highlight the particular importance of a man whose name is often forgotten when remembering that [postwar] era. I am referring to Senator Arthur Vandenberg. As a Republican, who worked closely with the Democratic administration, he was able to ensure non-partisan support of the program [Marshall Plan] in Congress. I consider it appropriate to draw a great deal more attention to Senator Vandenberg's merits than has been the case in the past.

[. . .]

For more than four decades the United States stood on the frontlines protecting the freedom of the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin. When the Soviet Union cut off the land supply routes to Berlin, the American government didn't hesitate to ensure the survival of the city with an unparalleled airlift. Millions of American soldiers protected the freedom of the Federal Republic of Germany during the decades of East-West confrontation. They have become an important part of the bridge of friendship across the Atlantic. This, too, we will not forget.

We never will nor do we ever want to forget how unconditionally the American government—I am thinking of President George Bush and Secretary of State James Baker—as well as

the American people supported us when the opportunity for German unification arose. Without this help and without the assistance and support from the other side represented by Mikhail Gorbachev we would—of this I am certain—probably not have achieved unity in peace and freedom with the approval of all our neighbors.

German-American friendship is an important, in my opinion, a precious achievement. The bridge across the Atlantic is stable and viable. Now it is time to build new lanes not least of all in the academic, cultural and economic sectors.

Germany and the United States are currently the world's largest trading nations. The United States is our most important trading partner outside the European Union. Since 1990 our trade relations have continued to grow. The United States has become the largest investor in former East Germany. It is important that we continue to deepen the economic relationships between our countries.

[. . .]

Mrs. President, ladies and gentlemen, George Marshall worked to create a Europe in peace and freedom, in security and stability, an undivided Europe associated with the United States of America. Today we are completing the work he began.

We are fulfilling his legacy by cultivating friendship with our American partners and by building the European edifice as a common home for all the nations on our continent. In my opinion, this is the best way we can thank George Marshall, a great American statesman, and Harry S. Truman, a great President.

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Selected Web Sites

For European Recovery: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Marshall Plan

This web site offers a wide range of documents commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Marshall Plan. Items to be found on this page include articles such as "Marshall Announces His Plan," "Fears of Communism," "Marshall Plan Countries" and "Benefits for the U.S. Economy" as well as references to books and European Cooperation links.

<http://lcweb.loc.gov/exhibits/marshall/>

The George C. Marshall Foundation

For over forty years the George C. Marshall Foundation has promoted the principles which made George C. Marshall one of the greatest American leaders of the twentieth century. Located in Lexington, Virginia, adjacent to Marshall's alma mater, the Virginia Military

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<http://www.GCMarshallFDN.org/>

The Official George C. Marshall Fiftieth Anniversary Web Site

This site is operated by the George C. Marshall Foundation. It is the web-based coordination center for events commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the European Recovery Program. This site is continually under construction and will include information on events

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<http://www.marshfdn.com/>

National Archives and Record Administration, Marshall Plan Web Site

This page of the National Archives and Records Administration lists information from the National Archives Library on the Marshall Plan. It introduces Richard T. Griffiths' new book *Explorations in OEEC History*, links to a paper entitled "Documenting the European Recovery Program: Records in the National Archives," and lists other web sites on the Marshall Plan.

<http://www.nara.gov/nara/naralibrary/news/marshall.html>

A Diverse Educational System: Structure, Standards, and Challenges

by George Clack

American education is a complex topic because a single school can draw upon resources from several different public and private institutions. For example, a student may attend a private high school whose curriculum must meet standards set by the state, some of whose science courses may be financed by federal funds, and whose sports teams may play on local, publicly owned fields.

Despite this complexity, however, it is possible to describe the broad contours of American education.

Many Choices

Almost 90 percent of American students below the college level attend public elementary and secondary schools, which do not charge tuition but rely on local and state taxes for funding. Traditionally, elementary school includes kindergarten through the eighth grade. In some places, however, elementary school ends after the sixth grade, and students attend middle school, or junior high school, from grades seven through nine. Similarly, secondary school, or high school, traditionally comprises grades nine through twelve but in some places begins at the tenth grade.

Most of the students who do not attend public elementary and secondary schools attend private schools, for which their families pay tuition. Four out of five private schools are run by religious groups. In these schools religious instruction is part of the curriculum, which also includes the traditional academic courses. (Religious instruction is not provided in public schools. [. . .]) There is also a small but growing number of parents who educate their children themselves, a practice known as home schooling.

The United States does not have a national school system. Nor, with the exception of the military academies (for example, the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland), are there schools run by the federal government. But the government provides guidance and funding for federal educational programs in which both public and private schools take part, and the U.S. Department of Education oversees these programs.

In American parlance, a college is a four-year institution of higher learning that offers courses in related subjects. A liberal arts college, for example, offers courses in literature, languages, history, philosophy, and the sciences, while a business college offers courses in accounting, investment, and marketing. Many colleges are independent and award bachelor's degrees to those completing a program of instruction that typically takes four years. But colleges can also be components of universities. A large university typically comprises several colleges, graduate programs in various fields, one or more professional schools (for example, a law school or a medical school), and one or more research facilities. (Americans often use the word "college" as shorthand for either a college or a university.)

Every state has its own university, and some states operate large networks of colleges and universities: The State University of New York, for instance, has more than 60 campuses in New York State. Some cities also have their own public universities. In many areas, junior or community colleges provide a bridge between high school and four-year colleges for some students. In junior colleges, students can generally complete their first two years of college courses at low cost and remain close to home.

Unlike public elementary and secondary schools, public colleges and universities usually charge tuition. The amount, however, often is much lower than that charged by comparable private institutions, which do not receive the same level of public support. Many students attend college—whether public or private—with the benefit of federal loans that must be repaid after graduation. About 25 percent of colleges and universities are privately operated by religious groups. Most of these are open to students of all faiths. There are also many private institutions with no religious ties. Whether public or private, colleges depend on three sources of income: student tuition, endowments (gifts made by benefactors), and government funding.

There is no clear distinction between the quality of education provided at public and private colleges or institutions. The public universities of California and Virginia, for example, are generally rated on a par with the Ivy League, an association of eight prestigious private schools in the northeastern United States. This does not mean, however, that all institutions are equal. A student who has graduated from a highly regarded college may have a distinct advantage as he or she seeks employment. Thus, competition to get into the more renowned schools can be intense. A college student takes courses in his or her “major” field (the area of study in which he or she chooses to specialize), along with “electives” (courses that are not required but chosen by the student). It has been estimated that American colleges and universities offer more than 1,000 majors.

Education, a Local Matter

From Hawaii to Delaware, from Alaska to Louisiana, each of the 50 states has its own

laws regulating education. From state to state, some laws are similar while others are not. For example:

- All states require young people to attend school; however, the age limit varies. Most states require attendance up to age 16, some up to 18. Thus, every child in America receives at least 11 years of education. This is true regardless of a child's sex, race, religion, learning problems, physical handicaps, ability to speak English, citizenship, or status as an immigrant. (Although some members of Congress have advocated permitting the states to deny public education to children of illegal immigrants, such a proposal has not become law.)
- Some states play a strong central role in the selection of learning material for their students. For example, state committees may decide which textbooks can be purchased with state funds. In other states, such decisions are left to local school officials.

Although there is no national curriculum in the United States, certain subjects are taught in virtually all elementary and secondary schools throughout the country. Almost every elementary school, for example, teaches mathematics; language arts (including reading, grammar, writing, and literature); penmanship; science; social studies (including history, geography, citizenship, and economics); and physical education. In many schools, children are taught how to use computers, which have also become integral parts of other courses.

In addition to required courses—for example, a year of American history, two years of literature, etc.—secondary schools, like colleges, typically offer electives. Popular electives include performing arts, driver's education, cooking, and “shop” (use of tools, carpentry, and repair of machinery).

Changing Standards

Until the 1950s required courses were many, electives few. In the 1960s and 1970s, the trend was to give students more choices. By the 1980s, however, parents and educators were taking a second look at this practice. The primary reason for their concern was the possible connection between the growth of electives and the slow but steady decline of American students' average scores on standardized tests of mathematics, reading, and science.

At the same time, college administrators and business executives began to complain that some high school graduates needed remedial courses in the so-called three R's: reading, writing, and arithmetic. About 99 percent of American adults reported in the 1980 census that they could read and write. But critics claimed that about 13 percent of America's 17-year-olds were "functionally illiterate;" that is, they were unable to carry out such everyday tasks as understanding printed instructions and filling out a job application.

Experts scrutinized every conceivable cause for the decline in average scores in the early 1980s. One target was television, which was accused of producing mediocre programs. American children, critics said, watched too much TV, an average of 25 hours a week. School boards were criticized for paying teachers too little, with the result that good ones tended to leave the field of education, and for giving students easier material to work with so that all of them could get a diploma—a phenomenon known as "dumbing down" the curriculum.

No single cause was identified for what ailed American secondary education. Similarly, there was no one solution. The U.S. Department of Education established a national commission

to examine the question. In 1983 the commission made several recommendations: lengthen the school day and year; formulate a new core curriculum for all students (four years of English; three years each of math, science, and social studies; a half-year of computer science); and raise the standards of performance in each subject. As a result, many schools have tightened their requirements, and test scores for American children have been rising.

In 1989 President George Bush and the governors of all 50 states gave the movement to reform American education a new impetus when they set six goals to be achieved by the year 2000:

- All children will start school ready to learn.
- 90 percent of all high school students will graduate.
- All students will achieve competence in core subjects at certain key points in their progress.
- American students will be first in the world in math and science achievement.
- Every American adult will be literate and have the skills to function as a citizen and a worker.
- All schools will be free of drugs and violence and offer a disciplined environment that is conducive to learning.

Congress established a program called Goals 2000, by which the states receive federal grants to help them reach the goals. By 1996, progress had been made: 86 percent of American students completed high school, scores on national math and science tests had gone up one full grade, and half of all four-year-olds attended programs to prepare them for school.

Meanwhile, there has been an effort to establish national standards in math, science, En-

glish, and history—an endeavor that President Bill Clinton strongly supports. Speaking to the National Governors Association Education Summit in 1996, he said, “I believe the most important thing you can do is to have high expectations for students—to make them believe they can learn, . . . to assess whether they’re learning or not, and to hold them accountable as well as to reward them.”

Social Issues in American Schools

In addition to the challenge to be excellent, American schools have been facing novel problems. They must cope with an influx of immigrant children, many of whom speak little or no English. Schools must respond to demands that the curriculum reflect the various cultures of all children. Schools must make sure that students develop basic skills for the job market, and they must consider the needs of non-traditional students, such as teenage mothers.

Schools are addressing these problems in ways that reflect the diversity of the U.S. educational system. They are hiring or training large numbers of teachers in English as a second language and, in some communities, setting up bilingual schools. They are opening up the traditional European-centered curriculum to embrace material from African, Asian, and other cultures.

Schools are also teaching cognitive skills to the nearly 40 percent of American students who do not go on to higher education [college or university]. In the words of a recent report by the Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills: “A strong back, the willingness to work, and a high school diploma were once all that was necessary to make a start in America. They are no longer. A well-developed mind, a contin-

ued willingness to learn and the ability to put knowledge to work are the new keys to the future of our young people, the success of our business, and the economic well-being of the nation.”

A Snapshot of American Higher Education

The United States leads the industrial nations in the proportion of its young people who receive higher education. For some careers—law, medicine, education, engineering—a college education is a necessary first step. More than 60 percent of Americans now work in jobs that involve the handling of information, and a high school diploma is seldom adequate for such work. Other careers do not strictly require a college degree, but having one can often improve a person’s chances of getting a job and can increase the salary he or she is paid.

The widespread availability of a college education in America dates back to 1944, when Congress passed a law popularly known as the GI Bill. (GI—meaning “government issue”—was a nickname for an American soldier, and the law provided financial aid to members of the armed forces after World War II was over.) By 1955 more than 2 million veterans of World War II and the Korean War had used the GI Bill to go to college. Many of them came from poor families and would not have had the chance to go to college without the law. The program’s success changed the American image of who should attend college.

About the same time, the percentage of women in American colleges began to grow steadily; in 1993 women received 54 percent of all degrees awarded compared to 24 percent in

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1950. With the end of racial segregation in the 1950s and 1960s, African Americans have also entered colleges in record numbers. The percentage of African Americans who go on to college, however, is still lower than the general population. In 1992, 47.9 percent of African-American high school graduates were enrolled in college compared with 61.7 percent of all high school graduates.

Liberal or Vocational Education?

Like high schools, American colleges are sometimes criticized for discarding required courses and offering too many electives. In the mid-1980s the Association of American Colleges issued a report that called for teaching a body of common knowledge to all college students. A similar report, "Involvement in Learning," issued by the National Institute of Education, concluded that the college curriculum had become "excessively . . . work-related." The report also warned that college education may no longer be developing in students "the shared values and knowledge" that traditionally bind Americans together.

These reports coincided with a trend away from the liberal arts. Instead, students were choosing major fields designed to prepare them for specific jobs. In 1992, 51 percent of all bachelor's degrees were conferred in the fields of business and management, communications, computer and information sciences, education, engineering, and health sciences.

This trend raises questions that apply to the educational philosophy of all industrialized countries. In an age of technological breakthroughs and highly specialized disciplines, is there still a need for the generalist with a broad background and well-developed abilities to reason and communicate? And if the answer to that question is yes, should society take steps to encourage its colleges and universities to produce more such generalists? Like their counterparts in other countries, American educators continue to debate these questions.

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The Community and the Classroom

by Denis P. Doyle

To Americans concerned about education, no term evokes stronger responses or conjures up more evocative images than "local control."

In the not too distant past, the centerpiece of every community in the nation was the "little red schoolhouse," the small building that was the symbol and substance of American commitment to mass public education. In many rural areas, the building had one room and one teacher for students of all ages; as recently as 1916, nearly one-third of the nation's 620,000 schools had only one room, and while today fewer than 1,000 one-room schools remain, they are a vivid reminder of a more bucolic past.

What has not changed is the school as community focal point. As the frontier receded, the school remained as a community center, meeting place and rallying point for local interests and activities of all kinds, not just education. Today, in almost every American community, schools are used during non-school hours for a variety of activities—meetings, handicraft classes for adults, senior citizen clubs, Cub Scout meetings, exercise classes, religious services and much more.

The idea of local control exerts a compelling hold on most Americans. In education, as in other walks of American life, the term means what it suggests: formal control is exercised locally, not by a central government. In this regard, education is not alone.

The constitution of the United States creates a federal system of government comprised of three broad layers: national, state and local. The general theory underlying this complicated and sometimes overlapping network is that control of all government functions should be as close to the individual citizen as possible and that each layer of government should do what it is best suited to do.

For example, the national government attends to matters of national defense, the money supply, international relations and other activities that are truly national in scope. The 50 state governments attend to those matters that they are best suited to deal with: state roads, highways and bridges; state courts and prisons; state colleges and universities; and the like. In turn, local government deals with those departments and activities which are uniquely local in character and scope, such as local courts, tax assessors, police departments and sanitation services. Historically, schools in the United States have been maintained by local government.

The roots of this tradition are found in two aspects of colonial American life: one a practice of long standing, the other a habit of mind. The practice was rudimentary education for the masses, a product of the religious pietism of the New World. Central to this particular religious experience was the belief that man may commune directly with God without the need for priestly intermediaries. Protestant pastors, to use modern terminology, facilitated the religious experience, but they did not create it.

In the Protestant traditions, then, it was essential that all communicants be able to read the Scriptures. Revealed word had to be accessible to the congregation as a whole. Thus, the first public school in America was established in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in 1645, authorized under the terms of a statute enacted by the colonial legislature. Education was not an indulgence; it was central to the Protestant experience.

The habit of mind important to understanding the role of education is a disposition to cooperate and collaborate. It is a product of the dual American commitment to liberty and

equality. Men who are both free and equal respect one another and work together freely, as equals. In the original colonies and later on the frontier, this idea was subject to the test of reality, and it was clear that it worked. Americans at the local level cooperated in most of what they did; raising roofs, making quilts, holding town meetings, participating in clubs and voluntary associations were the product of democratic cooperation and collaboration.

The great French observer, Alexis de Tocqueville, was impressed, above all else in America, by this “passion for association.” It was not the man on horseback that impressed de Tocqueville but people working together in fraternal associations, clubs, committees, town meetings and, above all, self-government. These twin commitments—a commitment to learning for everyone and habits of collaboration and cooperation—set the stage for the theory and practice of local control. To this day it is based on the belief that a free and equal people knows best its own self-interest and has the capacity, voluntarily, to cooperate and collaborate to secure it.

America’s Founding Fathers reflected this multifaceted view of education, believing it to be vital to the life of the new nation. Thomas Jefferson envisioned a free and equal people who would govern themselves and renounce the hereditary privilege of the Old World. A “natural aristocracy” of talent would arise and accomplishment would be limited only by the energy and discipline of the individual. While social classes would not disappear, the hereditary social class system would. Individuals would rise or fall on the basis of individual talent. Personal industry and enterprise would determine destiny.

Such a vision required mass education for its realization. The Founders were convinced that

free people could protect their freedom and enlarge its scope only if they were educated. Only if individuals are educated can they realize their potential. But while Jefferson and the other framers of the U.S. Constitution thought that education was important, they also believed that education was a local responsibility, properly exercised and led by the community. Education was not to be imparted by central authority; it was to be acquired by the people themselves.

The Constitution is deliberately silent on the issue of education. In that document omission was as important as commission, because the Tenth Amendment, known as the “Reserve Powers Clause,” reserved for the states all powers not specifically the responsibility of the federal government. As a consequence, the 50 states—not the federal government—are responsible for education.

The constitutions of each of the 50 states do make explicit reference to education and spell out the states’ financial, organizational and pedagogical responsibilities in some detail. As a legal matter, then, local school districts are creatures of the state, and the powers they exercise are theirs because the states have deliberately delegated them to the local authority. And that which is delegated under state authority can also be taken away by the state.

Whereas states can force local school districts to respond to their policy directives, the United States Government has no such relationship with either states or school districts, at least not in matters of curriculum, pedagogy or textbooks—or standards for teachers or students. Only in those areas in which federal questions arise—as in the case of citizens’ civil rights—is there any national government jurisdiction. Thus, if the rights of

a racial minority are ignored at the local level, Washington must step in.

This is what occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, in the throes of the Civil Rights Movement, when the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that 'separate but equal' school facilities for minorities were unconstitutional. The U.S. government initiated a long-term process to enforce integration.

The national government's role was also expanded in the 1960s when President Lyndon B. Johnson, in his "Great Society" determined that there was a broad national interest in subsidizing certain components of school life such as nutrition and early education for disadvantaged students. Washington made available to the states substantial funds for these purposes. With the funds came federal controls. Today, more than three decades later, a national debate centers on the degree of control from Washington that should accompany these grants. In spite of all this, however, fundamental education issues—what is taught, who teaches, under what conditions and for what salary, how one measures what is learned, the terms and conditions of advancement and graduation, which textbooks are used and how they are adopted—are all state and local questions.

Over the past 200 years the different levels of government engaged in education have come to work together and cooperate. For example, the national government in Washington provides, on average, seven percent of the revenues received by local schools; state and local governments provide the rest. Nevertheless, local school districts jealously guard their prerogatives and privileges. In fact, so deeply embedded is support for local control that no constituency group favors abolishing it. Whenever the national government adopts legisla-

tion that affects local schools, the legislative preamble invariably cites the importance of local control and the desirability of preserving it. [. . .]

To further understand the importance of local control in American education in the 1990s, it is necessary to briefly sketch the scope and scale of American primary and secondary education. Today nearly 46 million youngsters in 50 states attend schools that are organized into more than 14,000 independent school districts. While 14,000 may seem a large number, as recently as 1940 there were more than 117,000 school districts. Today, only Hawaii, the newest state, has a statewide school system. By way of contrast, California and Texas—both populous—have more than a thousand school districts apiece. Delaware and Nevada, which have smaller populations, have fewer than 25 districts each.

A century ago all the nation's school districts were small. Today 60 districts enroll more than 50,000 students each, and the biggest districts are truly enormous. New York City, for example, enrolls more than a million youngsters, and Los Angeles, the nation's second largest city, enrolls more than half a million. Local boards of education oversee school districts. The members of local school boards, variously known as trustees or board members, are elected, in the vast majority of cases, by voters. In only a few cases are they appointed; when they are, the appointing power is an elected official.

At the state level, state boards of education oversee the activities of local school districts. In addition, each state has an educational administrative head, who may be called the chief state school officer, superintendent of public instruction or commissioner of education. In some cases the commissioner is elected,

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as in California or Florida; in other instances, the commissioner is appointed by the governor or the state board of education.

Whatever the selection process, state governments determine the ground rules for local school districts: they determine the number of days that schools will meet—typically 180 days per year; they establish minimum state standards for licensing teachers and administrators; they identify a core curriculum; they may identify which textbooks should be used; and they occasionally buy or print textbooks and distribute them. In addition, they usually set standards for issuing diplomas upon graduation.

But the most important power that the state wields is financial. Not until the late 19th century were any state monies made available for education. The lion's share was always raised locally, typically by taxes levied on real property. An extreme example survives: In New Hampshire, one of the original 13 states, 95 percent of revenues for schools are raised locally.

Today, most states provide substantial revenues for local schools, and the type and amount of local tax levies are authorized by the state. A school system with a generous budget can devote more money to courses with small enrollments, such as advanced mathematics or difficult foreign languages, than can a school with a modest budget.

As a consequence, a state's threat to withhold money if a local school district refuses to abide by state law or rule is a potent incentive. For example, in 1985, the state of Texas adopted a "no pass, no play" rule. Under terms of this law, students cannot engage in extracurricular activities, such as sports or musical ensembles, if they do not maintain their grades. If a school

district fails to comply, the local superintendent does not face jail; rather, his school district loses its state funds—a catastrophe that would paralyze his schools.

While the formal authority of state boards of education and state commissioners appears to be great, all local school districts enjoy substantial autonomy and independence. They all develop budgets, establish pedagogical objectives, identify areas of curricular and extracurricular emphasis, adopt regulations and procedures, and hire and fire staff. Typically they are responsible for the design, construction and maintenance of their school buildings. Most deal directly with other special-purpose units of government as well as local, state and federal officials. If something goes wrong, the local school district and the superintendent, not the governor, are plaintiffs in lawsuits. And if weather conditions such as heavy snow or tornadoes are forecast, the local superintendent, not the mayor or governor, must decide whether to close school.

The habits of local control are still strong enough to exert a restraining impulse on state legislators and governors. In addition, there is a strong resurgence of interest in local control for pedagogical and professional reasons. Recent education research in the United States overwhelmingly supports the idea that decisions about pedagogy and certain elements of education content are best made locally. The research findings of sociologist James Coleman of the University of Chicago, who studied American public and private schools, confirm the work of Michael Rutter, who studied schools in England. Decisions about pedagogy and content are best made by the teachers, principals and families who make up the school. Working together, they establish the ethos of high standards and high expectations, something that cannot be done by fiat.

How-to-teach decisions are not suited to centralized orchestration and control; indeed, in the American tradition, many believe "what to teach" should also be decided locally—reflecting, among other things, the significant regional variations in modern America. For example, two port-of-entry cities, New York and Los Angeles, house more than one million immigrants each. The enormous ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity of these youngsters alone requires locally tailored responses to their educational needs and interests.

Of equal importance in the modern history of local control is the emergence of strong local teachers' unions. Bargaining units represent teachers at the local level, where crucial decisions about salary, conditions of work, curriculum and staffing are made. So deeply ingrained is this process that there is no state-wide bargaining; neither is there national bargaining, notwithstanding the fact that local unions are organized as part of both state and national associations.

The adage that "he who pays the piper calls the tune" is nowhere more true in American life than in education. When local communities raise most of the money for their local schools, they are strongly committed to local control and hostile to state or federal intervention. It is not surprising, then, that as the states have played a more active role in financing education over the past several decades, they have also begun to exert more state control over education, slowly but surely chipping away at the time-honored tradition of local control.

The 1980s brought the emergence in America of the "excellence" movement, a product of public concern that the schools had let academic standards slip. The excellence movement provided another role for the national government. The most important event in this

movement was the publication of *A Nation at Risk* [Washington, D.C., 1983], a report commissioned by the U.S. Secretary of Education. A panel of Americans from all walks of life asserted in the report that low education standards had reached crisis proportions. While the report was strongly worded, the general view it expressed was widely shared by the public at large and elected officials, particularly state legislators and governors.

It is one thing to want to improve education, but quite another to do it successfully. The excellence movement has prompted most state legislatures to require local schools to meet higher standards of academic accomplishments. While this is a most attractive and desirable goal, it is very difficult to achieve by edict. For better or worse, students cannot simply be ordered to do better. Improved student performance is a dynamic process that takes place not just at the local government level, but at the level of the individual student. Incentives and disincentives, rewards and punishments can be designed to change student behavior, but in the final analysis students must be responsible for their own conduct.

While local control, in some places and circumstances, is being challenged by state governments, either explicitly or implicitly, state control is still exercised through democratic processes. What the people do, they can undo, and if history and experience are a reliable guide, the practice of local control, so deeply ingrained in the American experience, will endure.

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Foundation of a Nation: Strong and Effective Schools

by Richard W. Riley

When the United States was created more than two centuries ago, one of the core concepts on which the hopes for the new democracy were pinned was the ideal that its citizens would be enlightened individuals with clearly articulated rights and the opportunity for individual achievement and education. Thomas Jefferson and others believed firmly that progress of the human mind was as important as, and had to coexist with, progress of the human spirit. They understood, as we do now, that in a free nation where the power belongs to the people, the commitment to education defines the progress of that democracy and is the catalyst for future progress.

Two centuries later, it is clear this core value not only has stood the test of time but also has grown in importance. As we move forward in this new Information Era and international economy, education is an increasingly vital commodity, a precursor of potential success and a driving force of change. It is important to recognize, however, that we approach education today differently than in the past. School and work used to be distinct worlds, in part because the kinds of jobs people had didn't require the kind of basic education and specialized training often required in the work force today. In the 1950s for instance, only 20 percent of American jobs were classified as professional, 20 percent as skilled, and 60 percent were unskilled.

Today, our world has changed. The proportion of unskilled jobs has fallen to 20 percent, while skilled jobs now account for at least 60 percent of the work force. Even more important, almost every job today increasingly requires a combination of academic knowledge and practical skills that require learning throughout a lifetime.

President Clinton has worked to help ensure that this new Information Age will also be an "Education Age," an age of increased educational opportunity for all Americans. He and I share the belief that education is "the way up," that a better standard of living depends upon an educated, skilled and competent citizenry. The President has challenged Americans to help ensure that once children go to school, they are part of an exciting and challenging environment of teaching and learning that will ensure that every eight-year-old can read, every 12-year-old can log on to the Internet, every 18-year-old can go on to college, and every adult can continue to learn for a lifetime.

We know that children who are challenged to learn enjoy learning—and generally learn more. And we know that a rigorous learning environment, in which every child masters the basics like reading and mathematics and where parents, teachers and students know how to measure what level of achievement students are reaching, creates opportunities for future success.

In contrast, children whose minds are not stretched are likely to be bored with what goes on in their classrooms and will have generally fewer opportunities available to them for future success. For instance, a child who doesn't know how to read independently by the fourth grade and how to do math, including challenging concepts like algebra and geometry by the eighth grade, will likely have fewer options for the future. These are fundamental skills that provide important gateways in secondary school for students to take a full range of core courses to prepare for college.

We are asking all students and teachers to meet high standards. We are working to ensure access to the newest learning technolo-

gies for all students. We also are working to make sure that every classroom has a quality teacher, that schools are safe and drug free, and that the doors of college are open to everyone who works hard and can make the grade. Finally, we are working to encourage parents, families and communities to get involved in schools to make them better.

At the heart of these efforts must be a focus on the essential building blocks like reading, math and science. Reading, in particular, is the most basic of basics on which so much of future opportunity depends. It is no surprise that throughout history, denying people the opportunity to read has been a goal of individuals and governments who seek to suppress a population and inhibit the intellectual growth of their citizens. The most repressive regimes have been those that have taken over the newspapers, television and radio, closed libraries and burned books. In contrast, a hallmark of democracy has been respect for the written word and encouragement of intellectual freedoms like reading and writing.

One way to strengthen reading skills is through our "America Reads Challenge," which seeks to mobilize all Americans to create long-term partnerships of committed educators and citizens built around every school, library and community to help strengthen schools and make sure the young people of those communities learn to read independently by the end of third grade. Among the many features of "America Reads" is the effort to encourage trained tutors to work with students and teachers to give students the extra attention and practice in the basics they need and deserve.

Although Americans today are reading as well as they ever have, it still isn't good enough. Forty percent of America's fourth graders cur-

rently don't read at the basic level as measured by the National Assessment of Education Progress [The NAEP test is administered to small samples of students in 43 U.S. states, acts as an overall indicator, but does not provide specific information on the performance of every student.] That is why President Clinton has proposed voluntary national tests in 4th grade reading. These tests would give participating schools a powerful new tool for raising reading achievement and would help parents, teachers and principals know at what level their kids are learning and would allow challenging and appropriate standards for what is being taught.

Our focus also includes a renewed emphasis on the "other" basics—math and science. The importance of these subjects could not be clearer. The U.S. Department of Education recently released a report demonstrating the link between students who take challenging math courses and their success in attending and succeeding in college.

At the same time that our emphasis on these basics needs to become standard fare, we also must work to make sure that our schools teach, use and apply the newest technologies for learning to supplement the traditional basics. Computers and other forms of telecommunications technology are a vital part of a sound education future and offer tremendous potential to help students learn basic and advanced skills and even complete academic programs and graduate degrees. The education budget President Clinton recently signed into law includes dramatic new investments in educational technology that will help increase the power of students to learn and teachers to teach with computers and other learning technologies.

With the touch of a keyboard or a trip on the Internet, students and teachers have access to

an immense assortment of learning resources, admission to world-class libraries and museums, exposure to new and engaging methods of teaching, and specific information and answers about almost any subject. Most important is that we ensure that these technologies are available to all and that they work to eliminate, rather than accentuate the learning divide between rich and poor. That is why I am so pleased that this Administration was able to help develop the so-called E-rate [Education-rate] which will soon begin to provide deeply discounted rates for telecommunications services like the Internet in libraries and schools.

This Administration has worked diligently to strengthen and support quality teaching in our nation's classrooms, especially in light of the ongoing record influx of students into our schools and the need for teachers in the most vulnerable communities. No profession is more vital to securing a strong and successful future for our nation than teaching.

The President recently pledged to provide funds to help 100,000 teachers become certified "master teachers"—one in every school in America—to serve as an inspiration and a model for others in the profession. But in addition to encouraging the best minds to come into teaching, we need to make sure that those who are already here want to be in the profession. In this regard, we need to counsel those teachers who are burned out to leave the profession through a speedy and fair process. Similarly, we must work to make sure that every school is up to the challenge of educating at these high quality levels. If a school is failing, we should be willing to close it down or reconstitute it. If a principal is slow to get the message, superintendents and school boards should be willing to replace him or

her. We know what works—we've seen proven reform like the New American Schools Corporation, which seeks to provide proven designs of successful schools to communities in order to revitalize their own local schools.

Even as we work to try and increase our national investment in education, it is not and should not be enough to focus on the financial side of the equation. The most important ingredient for building strong schools requires an investment of people. That is why this Administration has worked to make sure that parents, families, businesses and communities are an essential part of education. We've worked hard to encourage private businesses to become family friendly—to invest in schools in their communities so they can become stronger places for learning and to help their employees become more involved in their children's education. And we have tried, through voluntary efforts like our Partnership for Family Involvement in Education, to bring together families, teachers, businesses, religious and community-based groups for better education.

This kind of involvement can include everything from entire businesses helping schools and communities physically wire classrooms to the Internet to older citizens volunteering their time to read with a student or to tutor. I've seen businesses adopt classes and get paired up with students to mentor them and show them the opportunities that come with a good education. Quite simply, when students and families and schools come together, they open doors and create new challenges and learning opportunities.

There are real signs of progress and achievement in education today. In math and science, for instance, two areas where we have fo-

cused our attention over the past decade, student achievement is up significantly. Another sign of progress is the great increase in the number of secondary school students who are taking the core academic courses. This shows that we are finally getting serious about education in this country.

And perhaps most importantly, public education is beginning to turn the corner. We are not where we want to be, but we are headed in the right direction. Communities and families and businesses are getting involved with their schools and working to strengthen them. We must make sure, however, that we are not sidetracked by "magic-bullet" solutions that aren't really solutions at all but political gimmicks that work only to divide us.

Recently, the National Commission on Teaching and America's Future released a report entitled "What Matters Most." It noted that "there has been no previous time in history when the success, indeed the survival of nations and people has been tied so tightly to their ability to learn. Today's society has little

room for those who cannot read, write, and compute proficiently, find and use resources, frame and solve problems, and continually learn new technologies, skills, and occupations."

As much as any president before him, President Clinton understands the critical role that education will play in our nation's continuing success and the achievements of every citizen in this great nation. By working to ensure that our nation's historic emphasis on education not only continues but also is enhanced, we can help to ensure that our nation and every person in it has a brighter future.

Richard W. Riley, a resident of South Carolina, served as an elected official and governor of that state before being appointed by President Clinton to the cabinet post Secretary of Education in 1992. While governor of South Carolina, Riley worked actively with Arkansas Governor William J. Clinton to make important strides in education in their respective states. These programs helped shape the current national education agenda.

Excerpt from President William J. Clinton's State of the Union Address

**Washington, D.C.
January 27, 1998**

The Information Age is, first and foremost, an education age, in which education must start at birth and continue throughout a lifetime. Last year, from this podium, I said that education has to be our highest priority. I laid out a 10-point plan to move us forward and urged all of us to let politics stop at the schoolhouse door. Since then, this Congress, across party lines, and the American people have responded, in the most important year for education in a generation expanding public school choice, opening the way to 3,000 new charter schools, working to connect every classroom in the country to the Information Superhighway, committing to expand Head Start to a million children, launching America Reads, sending literally thousands of college students into our elementary schools to make sure all our eight-year-olds can read.

Last year I proposed, and you passed, 220,000 new Pell Grant scholarships for deserving students. Student loans, already less expensive and easier to repay, now you get to deduct the interest. Families all over America now can put their savings into new tax-free education IRAs [Individual Retirement Accounts]. And this year, for the first two years of college, families will get a \$1,500 tax credit—a HOPE Scholarship—that will cover the cost of most community college tuition. And for junior and senior year, graduate school, and job training, there is a lifetime learning credit. You did that and you should be very proud of it.

And because of these actions, I have something to say to every family listening to us tonight: Your children can go on to college. If

you know a child from a poor family, tell her not to give up—she can go on to college. If you know a young couple struggling with bills, worried they won't be able to send their children to college, tell them not to give up—their children can go on to college. If you know somebody who's caught in a deadend job and afraid he can't afford the classes necessary to get better jobs for the rest of his life, tell him not to give up—he can go on to college. Because of the things that have been done, we can make college as universal in the 21st century as high school is today. And, my friends, that will change the face and future of America.

We have opened wide the doors of the world's best system of higher education. Now we must make our public elementary and secondary schools the world's best as well by raising standards, raising expectations, and raising accountability.

Thanks to the actions of this Congress last year, we will soon have, for the very first time, a voluntary national test based on national standards in 4th grade reading and 8th grade math. Parents have a right to know whether their children are mastering the basics. And every parent already knows the keys: good teachers and small classes.

Tonight, I propose the first ever national effort to reduce class size in the early grades. [. . .] My balanced budget will help to hire 100,000 new teachers who have passed a state competency test. Now, with these teachers, [. . .] we will actually be able to reduce class size in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd grades to an average of 18 students a class, all across America.

If I've got the math right, more teachers teaching smaller classes requires more classrooms.

So I also propose a school construction tax cut to help communities modernize or build 5,000 schools.


We must also demand greater accountability. When we promote a child from grade to grade who hasn't mastered the work, we don't do that child any favors. It is time to end social promotion in America's schools.

Last year, in Chicago, they made that decision—not to hold our children back, but to lift them up. Chicago stopped social promotion,

and started mandatory summer school, to help students who are behind to catch up. I propose [. . .] to help other communities follow Chicago's lead. Let's say to them: Stop promoting children who don't learn, and we will give you the tools to make sure they do.

I also ask this Congress to support our efforts to enlist colleges and universities to reach out to disadvantaged children, starting in the 6th grade, so that they can get the guidance and hope they need so they can know that they, too, will be able to go on to college.

Educational Level of the American Populace (1997)



Source: March 1997 Current Survey, U.S. Census Bureau

Multilingual America and the Longfellow Institute

by Werner Sollors

American literature is literature written in English, right? That's at least what the common European practice of saying "translated from the American" implies. Yet is this still true in a "multicultural" age? After all, English has not been the only "American language" in which literature of the United States is written. In fact, the first people who were called "Americans" were, of course, the original inhabitants also known as "Indians" who have used a great variety of non-Indo-European languages. The European settlers who called them Americans (following the map makers' honoring of Vespucci) or Indians (after Columbus's mistake) and who settled in the areas that are now the United States wrote not only in English but also in Spanish, French, and Dutch. After them, and this is a well-known story, came waves and waves of immigrants who used such languages as Gaelic, Welsh, German, Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, Flemish, Basque, Portuguese, Italian, virtually all Slavic and Baltic languages, Yiddish, Hebrew, Greek, Finnish, Hungarian, Turkish, Arabic, Armenian, Farsi, Hindi, Vietnamese, Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and dozens of other languages.

The quantitative dimensions of the multilingual literature that has resulted from this history are mind boggling. For example, Widener Library at Harvard University alone has over 120,000 non-English imprints that were published in the United States. And the U.S. Postal Service which inspected the foreign-language press during World War I, assembled a six-page index of well over 2,000 American newspapers and periodicals in languages ranging from Ruthenian to Syrian, Bohemian to "Spanish-Jewish" (Ladino), Tagalog-Visayan to Rumanian, Polish to Bulgarian, as well as in many bi- and trilingual formats (such as Spanish-Portuguese, Polish-Latin, German-Hungarian, or Danish-Norwegian-Swedish). The files

of the National Archives, the American Antiquarian Society, the Library of Congress, the American Immigration Archives and the shelves of numerous other libraries and research histories of such polyglot publishing centers as Philadelphia, New Orleans, or New York alone could keep whole teams of readers busy.

Many libraries offer scholarships to students and teachers, and among the many texts to be uncovered and studied are not only works of interest to sociologists, linguists, and cultural historians, but also novels, plays, short stories, and poems—the aesthetic merit of which can only be assessed after a careful examination of the sources and comparisons with the anglophone canon. Yet ironically, just as the interest in "diversity" has intensified in connection with American multiculturalism, Americans have become more monolingually anglophone than ever. As a result there are many areas in which we know less now than did literary historians at the beginning of the century. The older histories still covered such fascinating texts as the Leni-Lenape Indian epic "Walam Olum," Lorenzo Da Ponte's Italian-language laments from New York, the New Orleans francophone writings by Michael Sélingy and Victor Séjour, or Reinhold Solger's German-language novel of manners and business life, *Anton in Amerika*. Yet in the course of this century such works, some of which have never been translated into English, have tended to disappear from public memory, and contemporary anthologies of American literature do not include them—perhaps with the single exception of the *New Norton Anthology of African American Literature*, edited by Henry Louis Gates, Jr. and Nelly McKay, which presents a translation of Séjour's short story "Le Mulâtre." Such exceptions aside, the rule still seems to hold that American multilingualism

is the blind spot of cultural studies, American studies, and various other national literary studies alike.

It is the state of affairs which prompted my colleague Marc Shell and me to stimulate new research in the vast, fascinating, yet neglected area that we first called by the somewhat awkward acronym LOWINUS (Languages of What Is Now the United States). Later we founded the Longfellow Institute (honoring the polyglot founder of Comparative Literature at Harvard University) and began a series of seminars, accompanied by a fellowship program for students and teachers bringing them together with each other, as well as archivists, translators, and bilingual American writers like Stratis Haviaras or Tino Villanueva. Among the fellows have been Orm Øverland (Bergen), Hana Wirth-Nesher (Tel Aviv), Caryn Cossé Bell (University of New Orleans), Steven J. Kellman (University of Texas, San Antonio), Xiao-huang Yin Pultar (Bilkent University, Ankara). Our seminar meets in Harvard's Child Library (within Widener Library) where we are also building up a collection of books out of Harvard's own holdings and out of donations. Marc Shell, numerous Longfellow Institute fellows past and present, and I have spoken about the project in various universities in the United States as well as in Holland and France, Poland and Canada, Mexico and Norway, Germany and Italy. Workshops and panels were also organized with international participation at the European Association for American Studies, the American Studies Association, and the American Comparative Literature Association, and the Modern Languages Association officially established a new Discussion Group on Non-English Literature of the United States (with meetings scheduled at each annual convention for five years).

So far, the Longfellow Institute has received grants from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, Harvard University, the French government (for francophone texts), and from TransCoop Foundation (for German-language literature).

At this stage, the project also needed to be accompanied by new publications, and Johns Hopkins University Press has agreed to publish a series starting with the pilot volume, *The Longfellow Anthology of American Literature*, a collection of multilingual texts that are presented with English translations on facing pages. New York University Press took on the first new collection of essays in the field, *Multilingual America: Transnationalism, Ethnicity, and Languages of America*. Many other volumes of primary and secondary literature will follow. Excerpts of texts uncovered by the project have also appeared in various journals (ranging from *Antioch Review* to *ACOMA*), and the popular American academic journal *Lingua Franca* carried a detailed account of the Longfellow Institute by Daniel Zalewski in its December 1996 issue. More information can be found on the World Wide Web at <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~lowinus/>

I believe that we are just at the beginning of what may become a major reexamination of American literature and history in the light of multilingualism. Located at the intersection of American studies and comparative literature, this is a good and promising field and ideal for international and interdisciplinary cooperation. Students and professionals who know languages other than English are likely to find it intellectually rewarding to enter the study of multilingual America at this time.

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Remarks by President William J. Clinton at the Airlift Remembrance Ceremony

**Tempelhof Airport
Berlin, Germany
May 14, 1998**

Chancellor Kohl, members of the German government, Mr. Mayor, members of the Diplomatic Corps, the veterans of the "Luftbrücke," and to the people of Germany: Fifty years ago this air strip was a pivotal battlefield in a war that had not yet been named. In 1948 the world could not yet speak of another war.

World War II had left Europe devastated and divided. Nowhere was the crisis more acute than here in Berlin. People were hungry and homeless. A hundred years earlier, Karl Marx had declared that a specter is haunting Europe, the specter of communism. In 1948, the specter's shadow fell across half the continent. The edge of that shadow was the runway here at Tempelhof Airport. The last European battlefield of World War II became the first battlefield of the Cold War.

On June 24, 1948, Stalin threw down a gauntlet, refusing to allow supplies to be sent to Berlin. It was war by starvation with more than 2 million lives hanging in the balance. The blockade stymied the British, the French, and the American allies. Some saw no solution and reluctantly advised evacuation.

The fate of free Berlin hung by a thread—the thread of air support. No one really thought it was possible to supply a city by air. A few visionaries, however, were convinced it could be done. They had no precedent, just the simple rules of conscience and ingenuity that determine all our best actions. And they had a President. On June 28, in a small meeting at the White House, Harry Truman said, there is no discussion on that point, we stay in Berlin, period.

From that moment the largest airlift in history began, the Western allies became protectors instead of occupiers of Germany. There are so many stories from that proud period—the leadership of General Clay and General Thomas; the American, British and German casualties we must never forget; the countless acts of individual kindness, like Gail Halvorsen, the famous "Rosinenbomber" who dropped tiny parachutes of candy to Berlin's children. [. . .]

If the communists could fight with fear, then we would fight back with friendship and faith. [. . .] Today I salute, along with the Chancellor, all the American veterans who came back to celebrate today. [. . .] And I salute the people of Berlin. Thousands of Berliners from doctors to housewives rolled up their sleeves to help Americans expand this airfield, building Tegel Airport from scratch, unloading and maintaining the planes. Your fearless Mayor, Ernst Reuter, inspired Americans and Germans alike when he stood before a rally and said, "We cannot be bordered; we cannot be negotiated; we cannot be sold." And finally I salute the 75,000 people from all around Europe who helped the airlift in some capacity and made it a triumph for people who love freedom everywhere.

Between June of 1948 and May of 1949, over a quarter million sorties were flown around the clock, day and night, in weather good and bad—roughly, a plane every 90 seconds at its height. But the most precious cargo did not come in the well-named care packages. It was instead the hope created by the constant roar of the planes overhead. Berliners called this noise a symphony of freedom, reminding you that Berlin was not alone and that freedom was no flight of imagination.

Today, a new generation must relearn the lessons of the airlift and bring them to bear on

the challenges of this new era. For the Cold War is history; a democratic Russia is our partner; and we have for the first time a chance to build a new Europe, undivided, democratic, and at peace. Yet we know that today's possibilities are not tomorrow's guarantees. For all the promise of our time, we are not free from peril. That is why I hope both Americans and Germans will always remember the lesson of what happened here fifty years ago. We cannot relinquish the responsibilities of leadership for the struggle for freedom never ends.

In the heat of the Berlin crisis, General Clay wrote, "I believe the future of democracy requires us to stay." Well, that was the best investment we could have made in Germany's future. It would be difficult to imagine a better friend or ally than modern Germany.

How proud those who participated in the airlift must have been when Germany reunified, when Germany led the effort to unify Europe, and when the modern equivalent of care packages were sent to Bosnia, Afghanistan, and other places ravished by war—when the people of Germany were among the first to send them. It was a good investment in democracy to stay.

Now, we must continue to build bridges between our two peoples. The Fulbright Program between Germany and the United States

is the largest in the world. This fall the American Academy in Berlin will open, bringing our leading cultural figures here. We will be working hard to expand our support for the Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange, which has already given more than 10,000 German and American students the chance to visit each other's countries. The next century of our cooperation for freedom has already begun in our classrooms. Let us give our young people the chance to build even stronger bridges for the future.

In his "Song of the Spirits Over the Waters," * Goethe wrote, "Man's soul is like the water. From heaven it descends, to heaven it rises, and down again to Earth, it returns, ever repeating." To me, these lines express the heroism of the airlift, for more than food and supplies were dropped from the skies. As the planes came and went and came and went again, the airlift became a sharing of the soul—a story that tells people never to give up, never to lose faith, adversity can be conquered, prayers can be answered, hopes realized. Freedom is worth standing up for.

My friends, today, and 100 years from today, the citizens of this great city and all friends of freedom everywhere will know that because a few stood up for freedom, now and forever "Berlin bleibt doch Berlin"—Berlin is still Berlin.

* "Gesang der Geister über den Wassern"